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Decided June 28, 2000
COURT RULES THAT GOVERNMENTS CAN'T OUTLAW TYPE
OF ABORTION
The New York Times
Thursday, June 29,2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled by a 5-to-4 vote
today that the government cannot prohibit
doctors from performing a procedure that
opponents call partial-birth abortion because it
may be the most medically appropriate way of
terminating some pregnancies.
The decision declared unconstitutional the
Nebraska law before the court and, in effect,
the laws of 30 other states. In addition, the bill
to create a federal ban on the procedure, which
President Clinton has vetoed twice and which
may reach his desk again this year, would also
be unconstitutional under the court's analysis:
like all the other laws, it does not contain an
exception for the health of the pregnant
woman.
The decision, with a majority opinion by
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, was analytically
broader than many people expected, finding
fault not only with the law's concededly
imprecise language, but with the absence of an
exception for women's health. At the same
time, the 5-to-4 vote was
unexpectedly close for a court where support
for the underlying right to abortion has been
counted as 6 to 3.
The combination of the broad ruling and
the close vote led Janet Benshoof, president of
the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy,
which represented the Nebraska doctor who
challenged the law, to describe the day as one
for "Champagne and shivers." The immediate
reaction from politicians and advocates on both
sides of the abortion debate made it likely that
the court's future composition would be the
subject of greater than usual focus during the
remainder of this election year.
The decision, one of four today that totaled
391 pages, came on the final day of the court's
term.
"Partial-birth abortion" is the term
opponents of abortion use to describe a
method that doctors use infrequently to
terminate pregnancies after about 16 weeks.
Anti-abortion forces coined the term in the
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mid-1990's and have focused on graphic
descriptions of the procedure as a way of
undermining public support for abortion. The
ruling today represents a significant setback to
that strategy.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's dissenting
opinion was a major surprise to both sides of
the abortion debate. Not only his disagreement
with the majority, but also the terms in which
he expressed his views both in this case and in a
second abortion-related decision today
indicated Justice Kennedy's deep unease with a
1992 decision, of which he was a joint author,
that had reaffirmed the right to abortion. The
second decision upheld restrictions on
demonstrations outside abortion clinics.
Emphasizing what he described as the
"consequential moral difference" between the
"partial-birth" method and other abortion
procedures, Justice Kennedy said that in its
1997 law, Nebraska "chose to forbid a
procedure many decent and civilized people
find so abhorrent as to be among the most
serious of crimes against human life."
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in an opinion concurring
with the majority, said it was "simply irrational"
to find a fundamental difference in one
procedure over another. Justice Stevens said it
was "impossible for me to understand how a
state has any legitimate interest in requiring a
doctor to follow any procedure other than the
one that he or she reasonably believes will best
protect the woman" in exercising the
constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
Eight of the nine justices -- all but David H.
Souter, who joined Justice Breyer's majority
opinion -- wrote opinions in the case, Stenberg
v. Carhart, No. 99-830. In addition to Justices
Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor joined the majority opinion. In
addition to Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas wrote dissenting
opinions.
In striking down the Nebraska law, the
majority went further than the federal appeals
court whose decision the court upheld today.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis, had found
Nebraska's law unconstitutional because, while
it was ostensibly aimed only at a particular type
of late-term abortion, its vague wording would
chill doctors in perforning a common second-
trimester abortion procedure that undoubtedly
had constitutional protection under the
Supreme Court's precedents.
The Supreme Court agreed with that
analysis but went on to rule that even a more
precisely worded statute that avoided that
problem would still be unconstitutional in the
absence of a health exception.
Surveying medical opinion on the subject,
Justice Breyer said there was a "substantial
likelihood" that the method at issue was "a
safer abortion method in certain
circumstances." He added, "If so, then the
absence of a health exception will place women
at an unnecessary risk of tragic health
consequences."
Justice Breyer called the ruling "a
straightforward application" of the court's 1992
ruling in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which
reaffirmed the 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade. But
the dissenters disagreed and said the decision
went further in the direction of protecting an
unqualified right to abortion. Justice Kennedy,
an author of the Casey decision, said the ruling
today was based on a "misunderstanding" of
that decision and "contradicts Casey's assurance
that the state's constitutional position in the
realm of promoting respect for life is more than
marginal."
James Bopp, general counsel of the
National Right to Life Committee, which
drafted the model law on which the Nebraska
statute and many of the others were based,
called the decision a "radical expansion of the
right to abortion."
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Under the Nebraska law, a doctor who
performed a "partial-birth abortion" that was
not necessary to save a woman's life faced a
sentence of up to 20 years in prison. The law
was successfully challenged in Federal District
Court in Omaha by Dr. Leroy Carhart and has
never taken effect. Dr. Carhart and his wife,
Mary, were in the courtroom today.
The statute defined the procedure as "an
abortion procedure in which the person
performing the abortion partially delivers
vaginally a living unborn child before killing the
unborn child and completing the delivery."
That was defined further to mean "deliberately
and intentionally delivering into the vagina a
living unborn child, or a substantial portion
thereof' before terminating the pregnancy.
Nebraska's attorney general, Don Stenberg,
argued that the state Legislature meant to ban
one specific procedure, known in the medical
profession as dilation and extraction, or D & X.
In that procedure, used beginning in about 16
weeks of pregnancy when the fetus's head has
grown too big to pass safely through an
undilated cervix, doctors seeking to keep the
fetus as intact as possible for various reasons
extract it feet first and then use a sharp
instrument to collapse the fetal skull.
But the lower courts found, and the
majority today agreed, that the statutory
definition of what Nebraska was prohibiting
also applied to a procedure known as dilation
and evacuation, or D & E, which is used much
more commonly for abortions after the first
trimester of pregnancy. In this procedure, the
fetus is dismembered during the abortion,
meaning that a "substantial portion" of it may
be pulled into the vagina while the fetus is still
alive.
In his opinion, Justice Breyer said the court
had to review the statute as it was written, and
did not have authority to accept the attorney
general's invitation to make it narrower.
Consequently, Justice Breyer said, all doctors
using the D & E method "must fear
prosecution, conviction and imprisonment,"
making the law an "undue burden upon a
woman's right to make an abortion decision."
To that extent, the decision tracked the
ruling last year by the Eighth Circuit. Where the
majority today went further was in its insistence
that even a more precisely written law needed
to have an exception to protect women's
health, in addition to the provision to save the
life of the mother, which Nebraska's law and
the other states' laws have.
Further, Justice Breyer made it clear that
the health exception had to go beyond
"situations where the pregnancy itself creates a
threat to health." He said that although the
medical testimony was somewhat equivocal, the
court accepted the view that "a statute that
altogether forbids D & X creates a significant
health risk" and would be unconstitutional for
that reason alone.
In the second abortion decision today, the
court ruled 6-to-3 that a Colorado law aimed at
protecting abortion clinic patients and doctors
from harassment by protesters did not violate
the protesters' First Amendment rights. The
decision, Hill v. Colorado, No. 98-1856, upheld
a ruling by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Within 100 feet of the entrance to any health
care facility, no one may make an unwanted
approach within eight feet of another to talk or
pass out a leaflet.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy dissented.
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy read their
impassioned dissenting opinions in the
courtroom this morning for more than half an
hour, making clear that this First Amendment
debate was in many respects a proxy for the
court's ongoing abortion debate.
Copyright C 2000 The New York Times
Company
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HIGH COURT VOIDS NEBRASKA BAN ON TYPE OF ABORTION
Ruling Cites Obstancle to a Woman's Right to End Pregnancy
The Boston Globe
Thursday, June 29, 2000
Mary Leonard
WASHINGTON - Reflecting the nation's
deep and emotional schism over abortion, the
US Supreme Court narrowly restated its 27-
year-old affirmation of the right to choose by
ruling yesterday that a Nebraska law banning
so-called partial-birth abortions is
unconstitutional and puts an undue burden on
a woman's liberty to end a pregnancy.
The closely watched decision, the court's
most important on the issue in eight years and
one sure to resound in the upcoming
presidential campaign, jeopardizes as many as
30 state laws enacted to outlaw certain abortion
procedures and could derail Congress's effort
this year to pass a bill banning the so-called
partial-birth abortions.
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the 5-4
majority, said Nebraska's law was
unconstitutional on two counts: It lacked any
exception for protecting a woman's health, and
it raised "substantial obstacles" to a woman
obtaining a second-trimester abortion because
the wording of the ban was too broad and
vague.
"Aware that constitutional law must govern
a society whose different members sincerely
hold directly opposing views," Breyer wrote,
"this court, in the course of a generation, has
determined and then redetermined that the
Constitution offers basic protection to the
woman's right to choose."
Breyer was joined by Justices John Paul
Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, David H.
Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Dissenting
were Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas.
Abortion-rights advocates marked a double
victory yesterday as the court in a separate case
upheld 6-3 a Colorado law that prohibits
protesters, leafleters, and "sidewalk counselors"
from approaching within eight feet of a patient
attempting to enter an abortion clinic. The
court said a protest-free "bubble" does not
violate free-speech rights. Rehnquist sided with
the majority in this case.
The decision on the abortion procedure,
which Thomas deplored from the bench as
"grievously wrong" and morally indefensible,
brought both drama inside the chamber on the
last day of the high court's term and angry
warnings from opponents on the plaza outside
that the ruling will not stand.
"The 5-4 decision reflects a radical
expansion of the right to abortion," James
Bopp, general counsel of the National Right to
Life Committee, told reporters. "The question
before the country is whether we are going to
tolerate a system of invented rights to abortion,
and that question is going to be answered in
large part by the election in November."
Advocates and foes of abortion rights both
seized on the court's action to remind voters
that the next president is likely to name one or
more Supreme Court justices during his term,
and could tip the court's balance on abortion.
Abortion opponents took heart because
Kennedy, who voted with the court majority in
the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
which said states can place "no undue burden"
on a woman seeking an abortion, switched
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sides and dissented in yesterday's Nebraska
ruling in Stenberg v. Carhart.
The presidential candidates weighed in, too.
Texas Governor George W. Bush, the
presumptive GOP nominee and an opponent
of abortions rights, said he was "disappointed"
by the ruling and "unlike Al Gore, I pledge to
fight for a ban on partial-birth abortion."
Gore's spokesman, Chris Lehane, said the
vice president supports a woman's right to
choose, including the right not to be forced to
undergo life-threatening abortion procedures.
Lehane said it was "particularly disturbing" that
Thomas and Scalia, whom Bush has called
model justices, dissented from yesterday's
opinion.
President Clinton, who twice has vetoed
bills banning the procedure called dilation and
extraction, said during his news conference that
he had "pleaded with Congress" to include
exceptions for the life and health of the woman
in its legislation. "I think the court decision is
clearly the only decision it could reach
consistent with Roe v. Wade," Clinton said,
naming the 1973 landmark case that established
abortion rights.
The late-term abortion case was brought to
the high court by Dr. LeRoy Carhart, a retired
Air Force surgeon who began performing
abortions in 1988 and runs a women's health
clinic in Bellevue, Neb. Cathart challenged the
state's 1997 law, arguing that it was so
restrictive that 90 percent of the 5,000
abortions performed in the state each year
would be threatened. Under the law, physicians
convicted of performing outlawed abortion
procedures would lose their medical licenses
and be subject to 20 years in prison and
$25,000 fines.
After a federal district and appeals court
ruled in Carhart's favor, Nebraska Attorney
General Don Stenberg brought the case to the
Supreme Court, where it was argued in April.
Carhart, who was at the court yesterday, said he
felt vindicated.
Breyer's opinion hinged, in large part, on an
affirmative answer to the clinical question of
whether dilation and extraction, or D&X, a
second-trimester abortion procedure in which a
doctor pulls a fetus feet first through the birth
canal and then crushes its skull and empties its
contents, is ever medically necessary to protect
the mother's life. "We recognize that D&X may
be safer for some women," Breyer wrote,
adding that decisions on appropriate
procedures must be made by doctors, not
legislators or courts.
O'Connor suggested that if Nebraska's
statute had banned only the D&X procedure
and included an exception for the life and
health of the mother, "the question presented
would be quite different than the one we face
today."
Thomas said his colleagues were missing
the point. He said Americans are so repulsed by
these procedures, which he called tantamount
to infanticide, that they have supported bans in
30 states.
"From reading the majority's sanitized
description, one would think that this case
involves state regulation of a widely accepted
routine medical procedure," Thomas wrote.
"Nothing could be further from the truth. The
most widely used method of abortion during
this stage of pregnancy is so gruesome that its
use can be traumatic for even the physicians
and medical staff who perform it."
Maryclare Flynn, executive director of
Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc., said
yesterday "was not a good day for us and not a
good day for Americans." The ruling, she said,
will require supporters of a proposed D&X ban
in Massachusetts to "go back and look at the
draft" of a bill now in the state Legislature
because it makes no exception for the health of
the woman.
The other abortion-related case decided
yesterday by the court, Hill et al. v. Colorado,
could put impetus behind a bill, now stalled in
the Massachusetts House, that would create a
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25-foot buffer zone around entrances, exits, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and
and sidewalks at abortion clinics. The state Wisconsin.
Senate passed the bill in February, and the Copyright 0 2000 Globe Newspaper Company
Supreme Judicial Court gave a favorable
opinion on the constitutionality of the measure.
"The fact that the US Supreme Court has
similarly decided that a buffer zone is absolutely
constitutional is all the more reason for this
legislation to be voted on expeditiously," said
Dianne Luby, president of Planned Parenthood
of Massachusetts.
Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in
the Colorado case, said that while the rights of
people to protest are protected by the First
Amendment, so, too, are the rights of
"unwilling listeners," particularly when they are
in the physically or emotionally vulnerable
position of seeking medical treatment. The
most valued and broader right, Stevens said, "is
the right to be left alone."
Scalia decried the ruling as "an unabashed
repudiation of the First Amendment," and he
accused the court of inventing "this newly
discovered right to be left alone."
He said, sarcastically, that the high court
proved it is promoting "aggressively
proabortion novelties."
"Does the deck seem stacked" against those
who oppose abortion? Scalia asked. "You bet,"
he answered.
SIDEBAR:
STATES THAT BAN THE
PROCEDURE
States listed by the Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy as having so-called partial-birth
abortion laws:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
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Last Tern:
Jenifer TROXEL, et vir
V.
Tommie GRANVILLE
No. 99-138
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 5, 2000
HIGH COURT LIMITS VISITATION RIGHTS OF GRANDPARENTS
Family: Judges Must Give 'Special Weight' To Parents' Wishes In Suits
Over Children, Justices Say In 6-3 Ruling. The Move Casts Doubt On
Similar State Laws Nationwide.
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, June 6,2000
David G. Savage
Parents, not judges or grandparents, have
the "fundamental right" to decide what is best
for their children, the Supreme Court said
Monday, as it struck down a broad Washington
state law authorizing a judge to order that a
child be turned over to her grandparents for
weekend visits.
The 6-3 ruling casts some doubt on the
court-ordered grandparent visitation laws in
every state.
Over the last 20 years, grandparents have
been given the right to sue and win visitation
orders over the objections of a parent, often a
divorced mother. The laws do not require the
suing grandparents to prove a parent unfit or to
show that they played a part in raising the child.
Typically, judges are asked to decide whether
visitation would be in the "best interest" of the
child.
Although the high court stopped well short
of declaring all these laws unconstitutional, it
warned local judges that they must give "special
weight" to the wishes of the parents.
The Constitution "does not permit a state
to infringe on the fundamental ights of parents
to make child-reating decisions simply because
a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be
made," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said,
speaking for the court.
Monday's ruling upholding parental rights
won praise across the political spectrum, from
the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Lambda Legal Defense Fund on the left to the
Family Research Council and the American
Center for Law and Justice on the right.
The decision was the court's first on the
issue of court-ordered grandparent visitation.
In practice, many judges are left to decide
simply whether it would be in the "best
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interest" of a young child to spend an
occasional weekend with grandparents.
Put that way, most judges say yes. In the
Seattle-area case that reached the high court, a
local judge sided with suing grandparents over a
reluctant mother and said it is "normally in the
best interest of the children to spend quality
time with the grandparent."
Rejecting that open-ended approach,
O'Connor warned judges that they must tilt the
scales in favor of parents.
"In an ideal world, parents might always
seek to cultivate the bonds between
grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless
to say, however, our world is far from perfect,"
she continued.
In the case of an intergenerational dispute,
the decision as to what is best for the child "is
for the parent to make in the first instance,"
added O'Connor, a 70-year-old who has five
grandchildren.
Ruling Doesn't Nullify Other State
Laws
Monday's decision does not nullify the so-
called grandparents-rights laws in California
and other states. "We do not, and need not,
define today the precise scope of the parental
due process right," O'Connor said.
But her opinion puts states on notice of the
rights of parents in these cases. Grandparent
visitation laws conflict with "the traditional
presumption that a fit parent will act in the best
interest of his or her child," she said.
O'Connor's plurality opinion was joined by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
Justice Clarence Thomas said that he would go
further and bar states from "second-guessing a
fit parent's decision regarding visitation with
third parties." Justice David H. Souter agreed
that Washington state's law "sweeps too
broadly and is unconstitutional."
Legal experts on both sides of the issue said
that grandparents who have cared for their
grandchildren and acted as substitute parents
should still be able to win visitation orders,
even when a mother or a father strongly
objects.
During the 1970s, the AARP cited such
examples in arguing for the laws. In 1998,
about 4 million children--or 5.6% of all children
under age 18--were living in their grandparents'
homes, the court noted.
But these are not the only grandparents
who sue. Others have gone to court after they
were cut off from seeing their grandchildren
because of a death, divorce, separation or
simply ill will within a family. These suits, rather
than bringing together extended families, have
sometimes led to long, costly and bitter court
battles.
The laws themselves are flawed, some
experts say, because they do not make clear
who should prevail when a parent objects.
Most of these laws follow a model set by
AARP and they give judges broad leeway to
order visitations.
California's law, for example, says that a
grandparent may seek "reasonable visitation
rights" if a judge thinks it would be in the "best
interest of the child." If parents are married and
living together, they can block a visitation
request.
No state appellate court has defined what
the law means and, in practice, most judges
decide based on what they think is best for a
child.
'A Kind of Warning to Judges'
"Justice O'Connor has issued a kind of
warning to judges. They need to be cautious
about ordering visitation," said Joan Hollinger,
a family law expert at the UC Berkeley Law
School.
Only in Georgia have lawmakers demanded
that grandparents prove a child will suffer
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"harm" without visitation. A few state courts
have said the same, but O'Connor said that she
and her colleagues were not ready to set that as
a national standard.
"Parents must be able to rear their children
without state interference," said Jay Sekulow,
counsel for the Law and Justice Center, the
legal arm of the Christian Coalition. Meanwhile,
Steven Shapiro, the American Civil Liberties
Union's legal director, said that the decision will
shield single mothers and low-income families
who cannot afford to fight such lawsuits.
For its part, AARP said that it was
"gratified the Supreme Court has proceeded
cautiously."
"The door is still open for grandparents to
go to court to seek visitation. The outcome will
depend on the facts," said AARP's counsel,
Rochelle Bobroff.
The Washington state case that was decided
Monday began in 1993 soon after Brad Troxel,
the unmarried father of two young girls,
committed suicide.
Six months later, his parents, Jenifer and
Gary Troxel, sued the girls' mother, Tommie
Granville. They wanted to take the girls for
overnight visits every other weekend and for
two weeks in the summer.
The mother refused, although she agreed
that the grandparents could have the girls one
day each month.
After hearing both sides, the judge
described the grandparents as having a "large,
loving family," and said that the girls would
"benefit from spending quality time" with
them. He ordered the visits for one weekend
each month and one week during the summer.
The mother and her new husband appealed
and won the case (Troxel vs. Granville, 99-138),
first in the state Supreme Court and again on
Monday.
Although the high court agreed on the
outcome, the six justices in the majority wrote
three opinions.
The three dissenters were divided too.
Justice Antonin Scalia said he agreed as a
personal matter that the parents' rights should
prevail but said that nothing in "the
Constitution confers upon me as a judge" the
power to strike down the state's law.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said he agreed
that a "custodial parent has a constitutional
tight to determine without undue interference
by the state how best to raise, nurture and
educate the child." But he urged caution and
opposed giving parents an "absolute veto" over
visitation orders.
Only Justice John Paul Stevens squarely
took the side of the grandparents. The rights of
a parent "have never been regarded as absolute.
Even a fit parent is capable of treating a child
like a mere possession," he said.
Copyright ( 2000 Times Mirror Company
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JUSTICES DENY GRANDPARENTS VISITING RIGHTS
The New York Times
Tuesday, June 6,2000
Linda Greenhouse
Declaring that parents have a
"fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody and control"
of their children, the Supreme Court ruled
today that a Washington State law went
too far in permitting a judge to order
visiting rights for grandparents over a
mother's objection.
With a 6-to-3 vote but lacking a single
rationale that could command a majority,
the court stepped cautiously and appeared
intent on avoiding a one-size-fits-all
constitutional prescription for a world of
rapidly changing family dynamics. As
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
acknowledged in her opinion for a
plurality of four justices: "The
demographic changes of the past century
make it difficult to speak of an average
American family."
Consequently, the court stopped
short of declaring unconstitutional a
Washington law, one of the broadest
regarding the rights of grandparents in
terms of permitting judicial intervention in
family affairs. Nor did the justices offer
much guidance for judging the
constitutionality of similar laws in the 49
other states.
Beginning with New York in 1966,
states adopted laws on visiting rights that
reflected the rising divorce rate and the
impact of custody battles that caused
grandparents to lose contact with their
grandchildren. While most state laws
make parental death or divorce a
precondition for grandparents to seek
visiting rights, the Washington law
required no such triggering event.
The four-justice plurality found only
that the law had been unconstitutionally
applied to order visits by the grandparents
in the case in question, a dispute between
Tommie Granville, the mother of two
daughters, and Jenifer and Gary Troxel,
the parents of the girls' father, who had
killed himself. Ms. Granville was willing to
allow some visits, but not the two
weekends a month the Troxels had
requested when they invoked the state law
and went to court. They won a modified
order that was invalidated on appeal.
A fifth justice, David H. Souter, voted
to strike down the Washington law in all
possible applications -- as had the
Washington Supreme Court in a 1998
ruling that was before the court today --
and a sixth justice, Clarence Thomas,
suggested in a cryptic, two-paragraph
opinion that he would do the same. Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
The tentative, splintered nature of the
decision, with a total of six separate
opinions among nine justices, all but
guaranteed that challenges to other state
laws would reach the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, the court did set a
constitutional bottom line that any statute
would have to meet, with a balance struck
clearly in favor of parental decision
making while leaving the door open to
upholding more carefully tailored statutes.
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The decision of a fit parent to deny or
limit access to a child is entitled to "at
least some special weight" or
"presumption of validity," Justice
O'Connor said, adding that it was these
characteristics that the Washington law
failed to apply in this case, Troxel v.
Granville, No. 99-138.
"So long as a parent adequately cares
for his or her children (i.e., is fit)," Justice
O'Connor wrote, "there will normally be
no reason for the state to inject itself into
the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make
the best decisions concerning the rearing
of that parent's children."
The Washington law, passed in 1994,
provided that any person may petition the
court for visiting rights at any time, which
a court could order when visits "may serve
the best interest of the child."
This was a "breathtakingly broad"
invitation, Justice O'Connor said, for state
judges simply to substitute their judgment
for that of the parents. But, she said, "the
Due Process Clause does not permit a
state to infringe on the fundamental right
of parents to make child-rearing decisions
simply because a state judge believes a
'better' decision could be made."
In striking down the law, the
Washington Supreme Court had gone
considerably further, ruling not only that
the parental decisions were entitled to
some measure of judicial deference, but
that in the absence of an unfit parent or a
showing of harm to the children, parents
had a constitutional right to exercise an
effective veto over any request for a visit.
In other words, the state court said, a
"best interests of the child" standard was
never constitutionally adequate.
Justice O'Connor said today that it
was unnecessary to resolve the question of
whether, in order to be constitutional, a
statute had to require a showing of
parental unfitness or harm to the children.
"We do not, and need not, define
today the precise scope of the parental
due process right in the visitation
context," she said, adding: "Because much
state court adjudication in this context
occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would
be hesitant to hold that specific
nonparental visitation statutes violate the
Due Process Clause as a per se matter."
The court's hesitation reflected not
only the novelty and emotional weight of
the issue, but also the fact that in the
American legal system, family law has
been the province of state legislatures and
state courts, with only rare occasions for
Supreme Court intervention on such
questions as the right of parents to choose
private rather than public schools, as the
court held in a case from the 1920's.
In a dissenting opinion today, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy said the court
should have confronted, rather than
avoided, the question of whether a law
providing for visiting rights in the best
interests of the child could ever be
constitutional. Injustice Kennedy's view,
such laws could be constitutional if
directed to people who had acted "in a
caregiving role over a significant period of
time," whether a grandparent or a "de
facto parent" of another kind.
Justice John Paul Stevens also filed a
dissenting opinion that called attention to
"the almost infinite variety of family
relationships that pervade our ever-
changing society" and warned against
adopting a rule that would allow parents
to exercise "arbitrary" power over their
children's contact with other adults. Judge
Stevens said the court should "reject any
suggestion that when it comes to parental
rights, children are so much chattel."
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Patricia Logue, a lawyer with the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, which filed a brief on behalf of the
mother, said it was encouraging that
justices on both sides of the case appeared
eager to maintain a level of constitutional
flexibility in recognizing that "there are
many ways to raise children" and that
significant relationships between children
and people who are not their biological
parents can be deserving of protection.
"The court is letting this area of law
evolve to meet the families that are out
there," Ms. Logue said.
Despite the variety of views the
justices expressed today, the differences
among eight of them appeared nuanced
rather than fundamental. The lone
exception was Justice Antonin Scalia, who
filed a separate dissenting opinion
rejecting the application of the Due
Process Clause and of what he called
"judicial vindication of 'parental rights'
under a Constitution that does not even
mention them." He warned that the court
was "ushering in a new regime of judicially
prescribed, and federally prescribed,
family law."
One undoubtedly unexpected result of
the case, which was argued in January,
could be to strengthen the federal
government's hand in its support of Juan
Miguel Gonzalez in his effort to take his
son, Elian, home to Cuba over the
objection of relatives in Miami.
"The bottom line is that there is now no
question that a parent decides for a child,"
Pamela S. Falk, a professor of
international law at the City University of
New York, said in an interview.
Copyright ( 2000 The New York Times
Company
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HUNT v. CROMARTIE
&
SMALLWOOD v. CROMARTIE
North Carolina's Redistricting Woes Continue
Meredith Lugo*
The nine justices on the Supreme Court and the officials of the state of North Carolina must
be getting tired of seeing one another. Once again this term, for the fourth time in eight years, North
Carolina will be battling plaintiffs' challenges to the constitutionality of its Twelfth congressional
district in front of the Supreme Court.
The confusion and litigation began when North Carolina was awarded an additional
Congressional seat as a result of the 1990 census. Plaintiffs challenged the subsequent creation of the
12th district, alleging that the state General Assembly deliberately created it in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a district in which African-Americans
constituted a majority of the overall voting age and registered voter populations. The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that the geography of the district was so irregular, and the state's reapportionment
scheme so irrational on its face, that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
separate districts based upon race. The Court further held that North Carolina lacked adequate
justification for such segregation. (Shaw v. Reno, U.S.S.C., 1993). The Court found that this deliberate
segregation violated the plaintiffs' constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind" electoral
process. Such segregation would have to survive strict scrutiny and be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest in order to be found constitutional.
On remand, a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina held that although the 12th district had been racial gerrymandered it was
nonetheless constitutional because the construction of the district was narrowly tailored to further
North Carolina's compelling interests in complying with the Voting Rights Act and eradicating the
effects of racial discrimination in the political processes. (Shaw v. Hunt, E.D.N.C., 1994). However,
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if these interests were compelling, the 12' district
was not narrowly tailored to further them. (Shaw v. Hunt, U.S.S.C., 1996). Justice John Paul Stevens,
joined in dissent by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and David Souter, argued that
the district was based upon geographical rather than racial considerations, and as such was
constitutional. Justice Stevens further registered his disagreement with "the Court's aggressive
supervision of state action designed to accommodate the political concerns of the historically
disadvantaged minority groups," calling such effort "seriously misguided."
In response to this litigation, the North Carolina General Assembly in 1997 formulated a
new, and what it considered improved, redistricting plan. The state contends it was guided by two
goals in devising the plan: curing the constitutional defects of the previous plan by assuring that race
was not its predominant factor, and maintaining the existing partisan balance of the state's
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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congressional delegation by designing District 12 to be a Democratic district. However, plaintiffs
allege the state actually excluded white Democratic voters in favor of African-American Democratic
voters. Once again a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina found in favor of the plaintiffs, granting them summary judgment because the
district was "drawn to collect precincts with high racial identification rather than political
identification." (Cmmartie v. Hunt, E.D.N.C., 1998). The Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment because the motivation of the
state legislature constituted a genuine issue of material fact and thus required a trial. (Hunt v.
Cromartie, U.S.S.C., 1999). The key question is whether North Carolina was guided by partisan
concerns or instead by a forbidden racial motive.
A trial was held on this question late last year, and the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina decided on March 7, 2000 that North Carolina had been
motivated by racial rather than partisan considerations, thus rendering District 12 unconstitutional.
(Cromartie v. Hunt, 2000). It is this decision that the Supreme Court will review in its upcoming term.
The split on the Court that has emerged in voting rights/redistricting cases mirrors that
which controls in affirmative action cases. The so-called "conservative" justices, Rehnquist, Thomas,
Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor, hold that is unconstitutional for states to make race the "dominant
and controlling" consideration in apportioning districts. (Shaw v. Hunt, U.S.S.C., 1996) The "liberal"
justices, Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, hold that it is illogical to permit states to take such
factors as partisanship into account while forbidding them to consider race, particularly since
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in response to pervasive racial discrimination denying
African-Americans the vote. Hunt v. Cromartie seems likely to continue this pattern.
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Ruling below (E.D.N.C., 3/7/00):
Although North Carolina's 12th congressional district was ostensibly designed to be one of six
Democratic districts in effort to maintain partisan equipoise in state's 12-member congressional
delegation, it is "racial archipelago," stretching, bending, and weaving to pick up predominantly
black regions while avoiding many closer and more obvious regions of high Democratic registration
but low black population, and even though apparently configured to contain less than 50 percent
black population in order not to present prima facie case of racial gerrymander, race was
predominant factor in its creation even though no compelling state interest in using race to create
this district has been presented; even if such interest did exist, 12th district is not narrowly tailored
and therefore cannot survive strict scrutiny, and thus violates equal protection clause; creation of 1"
congressional district, which has small black majority, was also race driven but was narrowly tailored
to achieve legitimate state interest in complying with Section 2 of Voting Rights Act while also
addressing other traditional, political considerations, including desire to protect incumbency of two
members of Congress by not placing them in same congressional district, and thus meets standard
of strict scrutiny and is not unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
Questions presented: (1) May plaintiff trigger strict scrutiny of Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 64
U.S.L.W. 4437 (1996), in mixed motive case simply by showing that challenged district is somewhat
irregular in shape and state considered race, along with number of other factors, in designing it? (2)
May plaintiff trigger strict scrutiny of Shaw simply by showing that challenged district was
intentionally created as majority-minority district? (3) Does final judgment from court of competent
jurisdiction, which finds state's congressional redistricting plan does not violate constitutional rights
of plaintiffs and authorizes state to proceed with elections under it, preclude later constitutional
challenge to same plan in separate action brought by those plaintiffs' privies? (4) Should court enjoin
election after state's election machinery is in full progress and require state to enact new redistricting
plan based on outdated census that will be superseded by 2000 census?
Questions presented: (1) Is state congressional district subject to strict scrutiny under equal
protection clause simply because it is slightly irregular in shape and contains higher proportion of
minority voters than adjacent districts, when (a) it is not majority-minority district, (b) it complies
with all of race-neutral districting criteria state adopted to govern design of entire apportionment
plan, and (c) there is neither direct nor compelling evidence that race was predominant factor in its
design? (2) In challenge to state congressional district, brought under jurisprudence established by
this court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny, is inference drawn from challenged
district's shape and racial demographics, standing alone, sufficient to support finding for plaintiffs
on contested issue of predominance of racial motives in district's design, when it is directly
contradicted by testimony of legislators who drew district and evidence that district conforms with
state's articulated redistricting criteria? (3) Following finding of unconstitutionality in challenge to
state congressional district, brought under jurisprudence established in Shaw v. Reno and its progeny,
is it abuse of discretion for district court to order state to conduct redistricting immediately when
redistricting would cause disruption to ongoing election processes and when redistricting will occur
anew following imminent release of 2000 census data?
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Martin CROMARTIE, et at, Plaintiffs
V.
James B. HUNT, Jr., et al, Defendants
United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina
Eastern Division
Decided March 7, 2000
BOYLE, Chief District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on
remand front the United States Supreme
Court's order holding that the underlying
case was not suited for summary
disposition and ordering this Court to
conduct further proceedings. Hunt v.
Cromarie, 526 U.S. 541 *** (1999). The
underlying action challenges the
congressional redistricting plan enacted by
the Genera! Assembly of the State of
North Carolina on March 31,1997,
contending that it violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and relying on the line of
cases represented by Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 *** (1996) ("Shaw IT'), and Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 *** (1995).
On April 3, 1998, a majority of the
three-judge panel issued an Order and
Permanent Injunction finding that the
Twelfth Congressional District under the
1997 Plan was unconstitutional and
granting Plaintiffs summary judgment as
to that district. *
On October 19,1998, the Court granted
a joint motion to stay all proceedings in
this action pending a decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Hunt v.
Cromartie, docketed in the Supreme Court
on September 16, 1998 as No. 98-450.
On May 17, 1999 the United States
Supreme Court entered an order holding
that the underlying case was not suited for
summary disposition and ordering this
Court to conduct further proceedings.
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 *** (1999).
In compliance with the Supreme
Court's decision, a three-day bench trial
was held in this matter, from November
29 to December 1, 1999. *
FACTS
As discussed above, in 1992 the State
of North Carolina established a new set of
proposed congressional districts. This
1992 Plan created two districts, the First
and the Twelfth, that were challenged by a
group of plaintiffs who claimed that the
State had deliberately segregated voters
into districts on the basis of race without
compelling justification. In Shaw v. Reno
("Shaw F), the United States Supreme
Court held that this allegation stated a
claim for relief under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On remand, the District Court found
that North Carolina's Twelfth District
created by the 1992 Plan classified voters
by race, but that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the First District. In
Shaw II, the United States Supreme Court
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affirmed this finding and further held that
the State had not established that its
reapportionment scheme was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state
interest, and therefore the 1992 Plan failed
the requisite "strict scrutiny" test. ***
The North Carolina General Assembly
convened in regular session on January 29,
1997, and formed redistricting committees
to address the defects found in the 1992
Plan. These newly formed House and
Senate Committees aimed to identify a
plan which would cure the constitutional
defects and receive the support of a
majority of the members of the General
Assembly. ***
To achieve the second goal, the
redistricting committees drew the new
plan (1) to avoid placing two incumbents
in the same district and (2) to preserve the
partisan core of the existing districts to
the extent consistent with the goal of
curing the defects in the old plan. *** The
plan as enacted largely reflects these
directives: incumbent Congressmen
generally do not reside in the same
district, and each district retains at least
60% of the population of the old district.
I. The Twelfth Congressional
District
District 12 is one of the six
predominantly Democratic districts
established by the 1997 Plan to maintain
the 6-6 partisan division in North
Carolina's congressional delegation.
District 12 is not a majority-minority
district*** but 46.67 percent of its total
population is African American. ***
District 12 is composed of six counties, all
of them split in the 1997 Plan. The racial
composition of the parts of the six sub-
divided counties assigned to District 12
include three with parts over 50 percent
African-American, and three in which the
African-American percentage is under 50
percent. *** However, almost 75 percent
of the total population in District 12
comes from the three county parts which
are majority African-American in
population: Mecklenburg, Forsyth, and
Guilford counties. *** The other three
county parts (Davidson, Iredell, and
Rowan) have narrow corridors which pick
up as many African-Americans as are
needed for the district to reach its ideal
sizes.
A similar pattern emerges when
analyzing the cities and towns split
between District 12 and its surrounding
districts: the four largest cities assigned to
District 12 are split along racial lines. *
An analysis of the voting precincts
immediately surrounding District 12
reveals that the legislature did not simply
create a majority Democratic district
amidst surrounding Republican precincts.
On the North Carolina map, District 12
has an irregular shape and is barely
contiguous in parts. *
Thus, it is clear that even after the
changes detailed above, the primary
characteristic of the Twelfth District is its
"racial archipelago," stretching, bending
and weaving to pick up predominantly
African-American regions while avoiding
many closer and more obvious regions of
high Democratic registration, but low
African-American population.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard
of Review
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The Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution provides that
no State "shall deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
taws." U.S. Const amend. 14, § 1. The
United States Supreme Court explained in
Miller vJohnson *** that the central
mandate of the Equal Protection Clause
"is racial neutrality in governmental
decisionmaking." Application of this
mandate clearly prohibits purposeful
discrimination between individuals on the
basis of race. ***
As the Supreme Court recognized,
however, the use of this principle in
"electoral districting is a most delicate
task." *** Analysis of suspect districts
must begin from the premise that "[I]aws
that explicitly distinguish between
individuals on racial grounds fall within
the core of [the Equal Protection Clauses]
prohibition" ***. Beyond that, however,
the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition
"extends not just to explicit racial
classifications," *** but also to laws,
neutral on their face, but "unexplainable
on grounds other than race," ***.
In challenging the constitutionality of a
State's districting plan, the "plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the race-based
motive and may do so either through
'circumstantial evidence of a district's
shape and demographics' or through
'more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose."' *** In the final analysis, the
plaintiff must show "that race was the
predominant factor motivating the
legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a
particular district." ***
Once a plaintiff demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that race
was the predominant factor in
redistricting, the applicable standard of
review of the new plan is "strict scrutiny."
Thus, in Miller the Supreme Court held
that strict scrutiny applies when race is the
"predominant" consideration in drawing
the district lines such that "the legislature
subordinate[s] race-neutral districting
principles . . . to racial considerations." *
Under this standard of review, a State may
escape censure while drawing racial
distinctions only if it is pursuing a
"compelling state interest." ***
However, "the means chosen to
accomplish the State's asserted purpose
must be specifically and narrowly framed
to accomplish that purpose." *** As the
Supreme Court required in Shaw II, where
a State's plan has been found to be a racial
gerrymander, that State must now "show
not only that its redistricting plan was in
pursuit of a compelling state interest, but
also that its districting legislation is
narrowly tailored to achieve that
compelling interest." ***
We are cognizant of the principle that
"redistricting and reapportioning
legislative bodies is a legislative task which
the federal courts should make every
effort not to preempt." *** "A State
should be given the opportunity to make
its own redistricting decisions so long as
that is practically possible and the State
chooses to take the opportunity. When it
does take the opportunity, the discretion
of the federal court is limited except to
the extent that the plan itself runs afoul of
federal law." *** Thus, when the federal
courts declare an apportionment scheme
unconstitutional-as the Supreme Court did
in Sbaw II- it is appropriate, "whenever
practicable; to afford a reasonable
opportunity for the legislature to meet
constitutional requirements by adopting a
substitute measure rather than for the
federal court to devise and order into
effect its own plan. The new legislative
plan, if forthcoming, will then be the
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governing law unless it, too, is challenged
and found to violate the Constitution."
II. The Twelfth Congressional
District
This panel must thus decide
whether the 1997 Plan's Twelfth District
violates the equal protection rights of the
Plaintiffs who live within the district and
challenge its constitutionality.
In Shaw I, the Supreme Court described
the 1992 Plan's District 12 as "unusually
shaped ... approximately 160 miles long
and, for much of its length, no wider than
the [Interstate] 85 corridor. It winds in
snake-Like fashion through tobacco
country, financial centers, and
manufacturing areas until it gobbles in
enough enclaves of black neighborhoods."
*** The 1997 Plan's District 12 is similar:
it is "unusually shaped," it is "snake-like,"
and it "gobbles in" African-American
population centers. The evidence
establishes that although its length has
been shortened by approximately 65
miles, it still winds from Charlotte to
Greensboro along the Interstate-85
corridor, detouring to envelop heavily
African-American portions of cities such
as Statesville, Salisbury, and
Winston-Salem. It also connects
communities not joined in a congressional
district, other than in the unconstitutional
1992 Plan, since the whole of Western
North Carolina was one district, nearly
two hundred years ago.
As discussed above, where cities and
counties are split between the Twelfth
District and neighboring districts, the
splits invariably occur along racial, rather
than political, lines-the parts of the
divided cities and counties having a higher
proportion of African-Americans are
always included in the Twelfth.
Defendants argue that the Twelfth was
drawn not with race, but rather politics
and partisanship in mind. They have
described the District as a "Democratic
Island in a Republican sea," and presented
expert evidence that political identification
was the predominant factor determining
the border of District 12. *** As the
uncontroverted evidence demonstrates,
however, the legislators excluded many
heavily Democratic precincts from
District 12, even when those precincts
immediately border the Twelfth and
would have established a far more
compact district. The only clear thread
woven throughout the districting process
is that the border of the Twelfth district
meanders to include nearly all of the
precincts with African-American
population proportions of over forty
percent which lie between Charlotte and
Greensboro, inclusive.
As noted above, objective measures of
the compactness of District 12 under the
1977 Plan reveal that it is still the most
geographically scattered of North
Carolina's congressional districts. *
Additionally, Plaintiffs' expert, Dr.
Weber, showed time and again how race
trumped party affiliation in the
construction of the 12th District and how
political explanations utterly failed to
explain the composition of the district.
*** Of particular note is Dr. Weber's
contention that a much more compact,
solidly Democratic 12th District could
have been created had race not
predominated over traditional political
considerations is the redistricting process.
*** Additionally, Dr. Weber showed that,
without fail, Democratic districts adjacent
to District 12 yielded their minority areas
to that district, retaining white Democratic
precincts. *** This testimony served to
undermine Defendants' contention that
race was merely a factor in creating the
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1997 Plan's 12th District, and that a desire
to place high-performance Democratic
areas (which happen to contain minority
populations) within Democratic districts
could explain the construction of the
12th.
Dr. Weber, who has testified as an
expert in redistricting cases in Louisiana,
Texas, Georgia, Virginia and Florida, also
presented a convincing critique of the
methodology used by Defendants' expert
witness, Dr. Peterson. *** Dr. Weber
characterized Dr. Peterson's boundary
segment analysis as non-traditional,
creating "erroneous" results by "ignoring
the core" of each district in question. ***
In summary, Dr. Weber found that Dr.
Peterson's analysis and report "has not
been appropriately done," and was
therefore "unreliable" and not relevant.
Finally, the Cooper-Cohen email,
discussed above, clearly demonstrates that
the chief architects of the 1997 Plan had
evolved a methodology for segregating
voters by race, and that they had applied
this method to the 12th District. The
Cooper-Cohen email refers specifically to
the categorization of sections of
Greensboro as "Black," and a scheme by
which this section was added to the 12th
District, creating a need to "take about
60,000" ether citizens out. *** It is also
relevant as evidence of the means by
which the 1997 Plan's racial
gerrymandering could be achieved with
scientific precision, as the precise racial
composition of another district (the First)
is discussed at length, along with plans to
"improve" that district by "boost[ing] the
minority percentage." ***
The computer system used by the state
has the capacity to identify and apportion
voters based on race, and to determine the
exact racial make-up of each district. Tile
Cohen-Cooper email reveals that exact
racial percentages were used when
constructing districts. *** Given that the
Supreme Court struck down the 1992
Plan's 12th District, the clear inference
here is that a motive existed to compose a
new 12th District with just under a
majority minority in order for it not to
present a prima facie racial gerrymander.
*** But using a computer to achieve a
district that is just under 50% minority is
no less a predominant use of race than
using it to achieve a district that is just
over 50% minority.
Based on the extensive direct and
circumstantial evidence presented at trial,
the Court finds as a matter of fact that the
General Assembly, in redistricting, used
criteria with respect to the Twelfth
District that are facially race driven. It is
clear that the Twelfth District was drawn
to collect precincts with high racial
identification rather than political
identification. Additionally, the evidence
demonstrates that precincts with higher
partisan representation (that is, more
heavily Democratic precincts) were
bypassed in the drawing of District 12 in
favor of precincts with a higher
African-American population. The
legislature eschewed traditional districting
criteria such as contiguity, geographical
integrity, community of interest, and
compactness in redrawing the District as
part of the 1997 Plan. Instead, the
General Assembly utilized race as the
predominant factor in drawing the
District. ***
This Court finds that, in contrast to the
state's claims regarding the 1st District, no
evidence of a compelling state interest in
utilizing race to create the new 12th
District has been presented. Further, even
if such an interest did exist, the 12th
District is not narrowly tailored and
therefore cannot survive die prescribed
"strict scrutiny." The 1997 Plan's District
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12 is an impermissible and
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
To remedy these constitutional
deficiencies, the North Carolina legislature
must redistrict the 1997 Plan in such a
way that it avoids the deprivation of the
voters' equal protection rights not to be
classified on the basis of race. This
mandate of the Court leaves the General
Assembly free to use other, proper factors
in redistricting the 1997 Plan. The
legislature may consider traditional
districting criteria, such as incumbency
considerations, to the extent consistent
with curing the constitutional defects. ***
THORNBURG, District Judge, sitting by
designation as Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part:
I join the majority in concluding that
the First Congressional district is
constitutionally drawn, but respectfully
dissent from the reasoning of the majority
is reaching that conclusion. I dissent from
the majority opinion finding the Twelfth
Congressional district to be an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander. *
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Strict scrutiny should not be applied to
the decision of North Carolina's General
Assembly merely because redistricting was
performed with consciousness of race. ***
As previously observed, the Voting Rights
Act dictates that race may not be ignored.
*** For strict scrutiny to apply, the burden
is on the Plaintiffs to show that "other,
legitimate districting principles were
'subordinated' to race," i.e., that race was
"the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's [redistricting] decision."
Plaintiffs may meet this burden through
either "circumstantial evidence of a
district's shape and demographics" or
through "more direct evidence going to
legislative purpose." * In Miller, the
Supreme Court recognized certain factors
as legitimate districting principles,
"including, but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests." ***
Incumbency protection, at least in the
limited form of "avoiding contests
between incumbent[s]," has also been
recognized as a legitimate state goal.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that states "may engage in
constitutional political gerrymandering,
even if it so happens that the most lqyal
Democrats happen to be black Democrats and
even if the State is conscious of that fact." *
In applying this high threshold
standard to the case at hand, it is this
Court's responsibility to closely examine
all of the evidence to determine whether
by a preponderance of the evidence the
North Carolina General Assembly
substantially disregarded legitimate
districting principles, including
incumbency protection and political
motivations, and subordinated those
principles to race in the districting
process. Only then can strict scrutiny be
applied to the decision of the state
legislature. ***
DISCUSSION
A. The Twelfth Congressional District
To show that racial motives
predominated in the drawing of the
Twelfth District, Plaintiffs had the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the
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evidence that the legislature substantially
disregarded legitimate districting criteria
and subordinated those criteria to the
improper racial motivation. A thorough
treatment of Plaintiffs' burden is
noticeably absent from the majority
opinion, but this burden must not be
overlooked or disregarded. Plaintiffs quite
simply have failed to carry their burden
through either direct or circumstantial
evidence. *** Defendants, on the other
hand, have produced ample and
convincing evidence which demonstrates
that political concerns such as existing
constituents, incumbency, voter
performance, commonality of interests,
and contiguity, not racial motivations,
dominated the process surrounding the
creation and adoption of the 1997
redistricting plan.
Consequently, they set out to
design a plan which, in addition to
addressing the constitutional deficiencies
of past plans, would protect incumbents
and thereby maintain the then existing 6-6
partisan split amongst North Carolina's
congressional delegation. *** Because
both the First and Twelfth Districts had
Democrat incumbents, and maintaining
the 6-5 split was viewed as imperative,
preserving a strong Democratic Twelfth
District which protected incumbent Mel
Watts' political base was absolutely
necessary. *** In creating such a district,
common sense as well as political
experience dictated ascertaining the
strongest voter performing Democratic
precincts in the urban Piedmont Crescent.
That many of those strong Democratic
performing precincts were majority
African-American, and that the General
Assembly leaders were aware of that fact,
is not a constitutional violation. *** Those
precincts were included in the Twelfth
District based primarily upon their
Democratic performance, not their racial
makeup. *** North Carolina's legislative
leaders have openly admitted to being
aware of the race issue, to being conscious
of the racial percentages of the districts
they drew, and to recognizing that their
redistricting plan could potentially be
subjected to federal scrutiny yet again as a
challenged racial gerrymander. *** Yet,
these were merely some of the numerous
political considerations which legislative
leaders had to account for in designing a
plan which would pass.
The expert testimony of Dr. David W.
Peterson, the unbiased statistician whose
opinions were referenced by the Supreme
Court in Hunt v. COmartie, supports
Defendants' position. Dr. Peterson opined
that, based purely on the Plaintiffs'
circumstantial statistical evidence, politics
was at least as plausible a motivating
factor as race in the drawing of the
Twelfth District. *** In other words, the
statistical evidence before the Court does
not support fine proposition that race
predominated as a motivation. Yet, it is
this same equivocal statistical evidence
which forms the backbone of the
Plaintiffs' case.
In an attempt to rebut this argument,
Plaintiffs relied primarily on the testimony
of their expert witness, Dr. Ronald Weber.
*** Dr. Weber also plays a prominent role
in the majority opinion. Dr. Weber argued
that the North Carolina legislature failed
to include numerous precincts in the
Twelfth District which had high levels of
Democratic support, but which were not
majority African-American. Consequently,
he contended the legislature must have
been more focused on race than on
creating a Democratic district. Dr. Weber
also criticized Dr. Peterson's findings as
"unreliable" and not relevant. ***
However, it is the testimony of Dr.
Weber, who admitted his belief that
legislative bodies should not be trusted to
draw district lines, which the undersigned
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finds lacking in credibility. *** This stated
bias is evident throughout his testimony
and undermines both his criticism of Dr.
Peterson as well as his assertion that
political explanations fail to explain the
composition of the Twelfth District. His
"hired gun" mentality and obvious
prejudice against legislatures fulfilling "the
must vital of local functions," attest to the
unreliability of his conclusions. ***
Overlooking Dr. Weber's lack of
credibility, his arguments still do little to
advance Plaintiffs' position. First, there is
no dispute that every one of the majority
African-American precincts included in
the Twelfth District are among the
highest, if not the highest, Democratic
performing districts in that geographic
region. Thus, although Dr. Weber pointed
to other precincts which he suggests are
highly Democratic in performance, this
does not explain why any of the highest
performing Democratic precincts should
be excluded from the Twelfth District.
Furthermore, Dr. Weber's entire line of
criticism ignored geographic realities and
one-person, one-vote principles. Weber
admitted that the precincts which he
argued are strongly Democratic were
chosen without considering where they
were located. *** Further, under
one-person, one-vote principles, Weber's
precincts could not all possibly be
included in the Twelfth District without
removing a corresponding number of
voters from elsewhere in the district. ***
Finally, Weber's analysis is flawed due to
the incorrect assumptions under which he
conducted his study. Weber admitted he
considered no hypothesis other than race
as the legislature's predominant motive,
and he specifically failed to inquire about
real world political or partisan factors
which might have influenced the process.
*** One reason for the focus on race was
Dr. Weber's incorrect belief that the
person drawing North Carolina's districts
could only see racial data, when in fact
North Carolina's computer screens
displayed information on political
breakdowns of both voter registration and
voter performance. *** This error, his
failure to account for other potential
factors, the flaws in his arguments, and his
ingrained personal bias combine to
undermine his subsequent conclusions
and criticisms. In the end, the undersigned
sees no reason to give any weight to the
opinions of Dr. Ronald Weber and fails to
understand the majority reliance on such a
thin reed.
Another significant shortcoming of the
majority's analysis is the failure to
adequately credit the testimony of the two
men who were the driving force behind
the creation of the 1997 Redistricting
Plan. *** Both testified that correcting the
constitutional defects of the previous plan
and passage of the bill by ensuring a 6-6
partisan split were the two central goals in
developing the 1997 plan. *** Indeed,
each testified under oath that politics, not
race, was the predominant motivating
factor in the Plan's development, with
Senator Cooper going so far as to call
partisan fairness an "overriding factor."
*** This Court's finding that racial
motives predominated in the legislative
process directly contradicts their express
testimony.
In contrast to Plaintiffs, the Defendants
adequately supported their position with
convincing evidence, even though they
had no burden of proof in this trial. ***
Furthermore, the General Assembly
had before it abundant evidence of a clear
community of interest in the Twelfth
District. *** The three urban areas located
along the Interstate-85 industrial corridor,
known as the Piedmont Crescent, share
common characteristics and face similar
problems. *** One statement submitted at
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a public hearing described the Twelfth
District as "uniquely urban in its dominant
issues," some of which were described as
affordable housing, alternative
transportation, air and water quality, and
various other complex issues found in an
increasingly populated and urban area. ***
As a consequence, the urban voters in the
Twelfth District as presently configured
have much more in common with each
other than with rural voters living on the
distant outskirts of those urban cities. ***
Senator Cooper felt that maintaining this
community of interest was one of the
legislature's motivating factors, and
indeed, the 1997 Twelfth District as
drawn reflected and protected the clear
community of interest in the Piedmont
Crescent ***.
The evidence presented by Defendants
demonstrates that politics predominated
in the drawing of the Twelfth District in
1997. Plaintiffs evidence does nothing
more than address the admitted fact that
legislative leaders were aware of the race
issue, or perhaps that the Twelfth District
could have possibly been drawn in a
different way to accomplish the
legislature's stated political goals. Such
evidence does not meet Plaintiffs' heavy
burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that racial motives
predominated in substantial disregard of
legitimate districting criteria. *** Only to
the extent race is used as a proxy for
political characteristics will strict scrutiny
be applied to otherwise permissible
political gerrymandering. *** Therefore, I
conclude that strict scrutiny should not be
applied to the Twelfth District.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lost amidst the smoking gun e-mails,
the "uncontroverted" statistical
information, and the indignant
examinations of irregular district lines is
Plaintiffs' burden of proof in this case.
The Plaintiffs must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that a
racial motivation predominated in the
legislature's decision-making and that
legitimate districting principles were
subordinated to those racial motivations.
The Supreme Court's remand in this case
affords no relief from the responsibility of
meeting this burden. Merely showing that
race was an issue, that it was always
considered, or that it had an influence on
the ultimate outcome is not sufficient.
The two men most knowledgeable
about the 1997 Congressional redistricting
plan testified before this Court that
political, not racial, motivations were the
predominant factor in the General
Assembly's decision-making process.
Their direct testimony, even when
confronted with the evidence relied on by
the majority, proves that racial
motivations did not predominate.
Therefore, strict scrutiny should not be
applied to the General Assembly's 1997
decision.
Finally, I am compelled to note that
this decision forces the North Carolina
General Assembly to create a redistricting
plan based on population figures from the
1990 census, numbers which everyone
admits are outdated. This new plan will
last only one year and will then be
replaced by a plan based on the 2000
census figures. ***
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COURT TO REVIEW TH
The News and Observer (Raleigh, NC)
Tuesday, June 27,2000
Wade Rawlins
North Carolina's contorted 12th
Congressional District - the subject of
federal court action throughout the 1990s
- could help determine how much race
shapes the way political lines are drawn in
the next decade.
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday
agreed to review the 1997 version of
North Carolina's 12th District, one in
which state officials say politics, not race,
played the leading role in setting
boundaries.
In March, a three-judge federal panel
ruled that the 12th District, which
stretches from Charlotte to Greensboro,
was an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander, as drawn in a 1997
redistricting plan. It ordered new districts
drawn.
By agreeing Monday to review the
case, the Supreme Court affirmed the stay
of the lower court's order. That means
that this year's congressional elections will
proceed using the 1997 map while the
case remains on appeal.
"This is good news for the voters,"
Attorney General Mike Easley said in a
statement. "... I hope that the Court, in
their decision, will provide some guidance
to the next legislature as they redraw the
maps based on the recent census."
Legislatures are required to draw new
congressional and legislative districts every
decade after the census. The 12th District
boundaries will be redrawn next year,
regardless of how the Supreme Court
rules.
So in agreeing to take the case, the
court possibly is trying to clarify legal
guidelines for drawing districts, as it did
last year in overturning the three-judge
panel's summary judgment decision
throwing out the district.
"There is no need to take a case
involving redistricting in the year 2000
unless you are trying to do something you
haven't done before," said Neil Bradley,
associate director of the southern regional
office of the American Civil Liberties
Union in Atlanta. "They were struggling
to give guidance before. I would assume
that is what they are going to do again."
It is the fourth time the case will go
before the Supreme Court since 1990.
Robinson Everett, a Duke University
law professor who has represented six
white plaintiffs, said he was puzzled why
the Supreme Court didn't uphold the
lower court and order new districts.
"We obviously were disappointed
because we didn't think there was any
legal issue to hear," Everett said. "It
seemed like a factual issue decided by the
lower court."
The issue centers on how much the
federal Voting Rights Act requires race to
be considered in drawing congressional
districts. The courts have said that race
may be considered in drawing district lines
but may not be the predominant factor.
Lawyers for the state Attorney
General's Office contended that
legislators crafted district boundaries in
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1997 to preserve partisan balance in the
congressional delegation and to make a
plan acceptable to a majority of
Republican and Democrat legislators.
But Everett said legislators sought to
preserve a racial core of black voters when
they redrew the 12th District.
Throughout the 1990s, lawmakers
have struggled to balance requirements of
the Voting Rights Act, which is aimed at
increasing minority representation, and
court dictates limiting the extent to which
race can be used as a factor in drawing
districts.
After the legislature in 1991 drew two
congressional districts with majorities of
African-American voters, voters elected
the first African-Americans to serve in
Congress from North Carolina since 1901
- U.S. Reps. Mel Watt of Charlotte and
Eva Clayton of Littleton.
But Watt's long, meandering 12th
District has been continually under attack
since its inception.
In 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that
lawmakers took race too much into
account in drawing the 12th District after
the 1990 census and declared the district
unconstitutional.
The legislature redrew the districts in
1997. But before the 1997 map was ever
used in an election, a federal court panel
threw it out as unconstitutional.
Legislators then crafted another plan
in 1998, which was used in that year's
election, while the state appealed the
court's rejection of the 1997 map.
When the Supreme Court overturned
the lower court's ruling on the 1997 map
and ordered a trial, the map immediately
was reinstated for the 2000 elections. The
12th District as currently drawn has a
black population of 47 percent.
"I'm the eternal optimist .... said U.S.
Rep. Howard Coble, a Greensboro
Republican whose district abuts Watt's
and has been altered by previous court
decisions. "I hope some good markers will
be laid down by the court on what
constitutes constitutionality."
Copyright C 2000 The Raleigh News
and Observer
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JUDGES TO RULE ON N.C. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
The News and Observer (Raleigh, NC)
Thursday, December 2, 1999
Wade Rawlins
Whether candidates for Congress in
North Carolina run from new districts
next year depends on what three federal
judges say about the constitutionality of
the state's congressional districts.
After a three-day trial, a special three-
judge panel now will decide whether state
legislators took voters' race too much into
account when they redesigned the state's
congressional map in 1997 after the court
had declared an earlier map
unconstitutional.
The case remains important because
the state's 2000 congressional elections
will be held using the 1997 district map,
unless the court throws out the plan and
orders the state to draw another map.
Current members of Congress were
elected under a plan no longer in use.
Two congressional districts with
sizable African-American populations
were the focus of the trial.
The 1st District, represented by
Democrat Rep. Eva Clayton, covers the
northeastern part of the state and has a
50.2 percent majority of African
Americans. The 12th District, which
Democrat Mel Watt represents, stretches
from Greensboro to Charlotte, and more
than 46.6 percent of its population is
black. Elected in 1992, Clayton and Watt
are North Carolina's first African-
American members of Congress since
Reconstruction.
Lawyers for the state attorney general
and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
contended that legislators crafted district
boundaries in 1997 to make a plan
acceptable to a majority of
Republican and Democrat legislators.
They said the plan was intended to
preserve the partisan balance of six
Republicans and six Democrats in
Congress.
But. the lawsuit, brought by Durham
lawyer Robinson Everett, contends that
the 1st and 12th district boundaries are
illegal racial gerrymanders and
unconstitutional. The courts have said that
race can be considered in drawing district
lines, but may not be the predominant
factor.
Everett said he was pursuing his
challenge because the 1997 plan, if
allowed to stand, would become the
benchmark for drawing new congressional
districts after the 2000 census.
In building his case, Everett
introduced a Feb. 10, 1997 memo to state
Sen. Roy Cooper, a Rocky Mount
Democrat and head of the Senate's
redistricting committee, from Gerry
Cohen, the legislature's chief mapmaker.
Cohen's memo said in part: "By
shifting areas in Beaufort, Pitt, Craven and
Jones counties, I was able to boost the
minority percentage in the First District
from 48.1 percent to 49.25 percent. ... I
have moved the Greensboro black
community into the 12th District, and
now need to take about 60,000 voters out
of the 12th District."
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Everett told the court that the memo
was "a smoking gun," revealing legislators'
motives. "They do not refer to
Greensboro's Democrat community," he
said. "They refer to Greensboro's black
community. They were thinking in terms
of race."
Questioned about the memo during
the trial, Cooper said he didn't remember
it and did not direct Cohen to move
Greensboro's black community into the
12th District.
But under cross examination Cooper
was asked about a 1997 speech to the
Senate in which he said the plan preserved
partisan and racial balance.
Cooper replied: "We did pay attention
to race, but it was certainly not the
predominant factor."
Everett also produced evidence that
90 percent of the black voters in District
12 in 1997 were in the district in the
unconstitutional 1992 plan while less than
50 percent of whites were in the earlier
version. He said that movement of white
voters showed mapmakers were trying to
preserve a racial core of black voters.
The state's expert witness, David
Peterson, a statistician and retired Duke
University professor, testified that his
analysis of voting precincts was
inconclusive as to whether partisan
politics or race played a larger role.
Copyright Q 2000 The Raleigh News
and Observer
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Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams
Are You Signing Your Rights Away? The Supreme Court Will Decide Whether
Workers Can Be Forced to Arbitrate Disputes with their Employers
Meredith Lugo*
The issue in Circuit Ciy v. Adams is whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
applies to employment contracts. Contrary to all other circuits, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently held that it does not. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict. Although the importance of Crcuit Oty can easily be overlooked, in an
age in which employers increasingly require workers to agree to binding arbitration as a
condition of employment, the decision will either effectively obliterate the effect of these
arbitration provisions or result in the inability of many workers to sue their employers for
even the most egregious violations of state and federal statutes.
St. Clair Adams worked as a salesman for Circuit City for fourteen months in 1995
and 1996. As part of his job application, on October 23, 1995 he signed a Dispute
Resolution Agreement (DRA) stating he would submit all claims relating to his employment
exclusively to arbitration. However, after quitting in 1996 Adams attempted to sue Circuit
City under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, alleging he suffered a hostile
work environment due to repeated sexual comments made by both supervisors and
coworkers. Circuit City sought enforcement of the DRA and was granted summary
judgment on that basis in May of 1998. The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed, and this
appeal followed.
The Ninth Circuit's decision was controlled by its earlier holding in Craft v. Campbell
Soup Company (1999) that the FAA does not apply to labor or employment contracts. The
relevant provisions of the FAA are Sections 1 and 2. Section 2 makes the arbitration
provisions of "contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving commerce" valid and
enforceable. However, Section 1 contains an exception: "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." All other circuits, guided by the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration, have narrowly construed this exception, holding that it
excludes only those contracts of employees actually engaged in the channels of interstate
commerce. These courts have also reasoned that if Congress had meant the exception within
Section 1 to apply to all employment contracts it would have made no sense to specifically
refer to certain types of employees in the statute.
The Ninth Circuit in Craft rejected this reasoning and focused on legislative history
and the understanding of the extent of Congress' power under the commerce clause which
existed in 1925 (when the FAA was passed) to conclude that Congress never intended the
FAA to cover such contracts. In 1925, it was generally believed that such power was narrow,
and Congress at that time recognized that it was only authorized to regulate employees
directly involved in interstate commerce. Yet Congress expressly refused to include the
employment contracts of these employees in the scope of the FAA. This, the judges
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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contend, provides clear evidence of Congress' intent to completely exempt employment
contracts from the FAA. Although a minority of one among the circuits, the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation does have at least one adherent on the current Supreme Court - in his dissent
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, although the issue was not reached by the full
court, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that arbitration clauses contained in employment
agreements were specifically exempt from the FAA. Bound by its holding in Craft, the Ninth
Circuit in deciding Circuit Ciy had only to determine whether the DRA signed by Adams
constituted an employment contract. The judges held that it did, rejecting Circuit City's claim
to the contrary, because it served as a condition precedent to Adams' employment.
As noted, if the Supreme Court upholds the Ninth Circuit's interpretation it will have
a dramatic impact on the ability of employers to require employees to sign arbitration
agreements. The case also implicates federalism concerns. Large companies that operate in
more than one state favor a uniform federal standard rather than numerous, often-
conflicting state standards, and prefer to use arbitration to resolve disputes rather than
risking potentially large jury awards. The key question is whether state or federal courts
should be deciding employment disputes. It remains to be seen how Circuit Giy will fit into
the Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence.
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99-1379 Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams
Ruling below (9h Cir., 194 F.3d 1070, 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 720):
Dispute resolution agreement that employee must sign as condition precedent to
employment and that requires employees to submit all claims and disputes to mutually
binding arbitration sets forth terms and conditions of employment and therefore constitutes
employment contract, notwithstanding disclaimer in agreement to contrary, and, as such, is
not covered by Federal Arbitration Act; accordingly, district court lacked authority to compel
arbitration under Section 4 of FAA.
Question presented: Did Ninth Circuit err in holding, directly contrary to holding of every
other U.S. court of appeals, that FAA does not apply to contracts of employment?
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CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC., a Virginia corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Saint Clair ADAMS, a California resident, Defendant-
Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Filed November 18, 1999
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the district
court's final order compelling arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C.A. § 1, et seq. *** ("FAA"). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The district court, however, lacked the
authority, as a matter of substantive law,
to compel arbitration because the Federal
Arbitration Act does not apply to this
case. In Craft v. Campbell Soup Co. ***, we
held that the FAA does not apply to labor
or employment contracts.
Factual and Procedural Background
Saint Clair Adams appeals the district
court's order staying the state court action
and compelling arbitration. Circuit City
sought mutually binding arbitration under
Section 4 of the FAA in response to
Adams's state court lawsuit under the
California Fair Employment and Housing
Act ("FEHA"). On October 23, 1995,
Adams completed a six-page application
to work at Circuit City Stores. On pages
two and three of the application, Adams
signed a document titled "Circuit City
Dispute Resolution Agreement" ("DRA").
The DRA requires that employees submit
all claims and disputes to mutually binding
arbitration.' An employee cannot work at
I The DRA specifies that job applicants
agree to settle "all previously unasserted
claims, disputes or controversies arising
Circuit City without signing the DRA. If
the employee signs the DRA and then
withdraws consent within three days, the
employee "will no longer be eligible for
employment at Circuit City."
Discussion
Circuit City sought arbitration
pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA and
asserted jurisdiction pursuant to Section 4
and 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We recognize that
the FAA is not a jurisdictional statute:
[The FAA] is something of an anomaly in
the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It
creates a body of federal substantive law
establishing and regulating the duty to
honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it
does not create any independent federal
question jurisdiction under [§ 1331] or
out of or relating to my application or
candidacy for employment, employment
and/or cessation of employment with
Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding
arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By
way of example only, such claims include
claims under federal, state, and local
statutory or common law, such as Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, including the amendments to
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the law
of contract and law of tort."
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otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order
compelling arbitration only when the
federal district court would have
jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying
dispute; hence, there must be diversity of
citizenship or some other basis for federal
jurisdiction.
*** In this case, we need not consider
whether the district court had underlying
federal question jurisdiction because the
FAA is inapplicable. As a threshold
matter, therefore, the district court lacked
the authority under Section 4 of the FAA
to compel arbitration.
We must find that the FAA is
inapplicable to this case under Craft if the
DRA is an employment contract. This
court has defined an "employment
contract" as "an agreement setting forth
'terms and conditions' of employment."
We find that the arbitration agreement
in this case was an employment contract
notwithstanding the disclaimer in the
DRA. The DRA specifically states: "I
understand that neither this Agreement
nor the Dispute Resolution Rules and
Procedures form a contract of
employment between Circuit City and
me." Furthermore, it says that "this
Agreement in no way alters the 'at-will'
status of my employment." Though the
DRA may not alter Adams's status as an
at-will employee, the agreement was a
condition precedent to his employment.
The agreement was an employment
contract, rendering the FAA inapplicable.
See Craft ***. Thus, we reverse the district
court's order compelling arbitration and
remand to the district court for dismissal
because of a lack of federal authority.
REVERSE AND REMAND.
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JUSTICES TO REVIEW CIRCUIT CITY ARBITRATION CASE
The Wall Street Journal
Tuesday, May 23, 2000
Robert S. Greenberger
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court
agreed to review a case that will determine
whether businesses can require employees to
settle disputes through arbitration or if
workers can sue their employers.
At issue is how broadly to apply an
exception to coverage under the Federal
Arbitration Act, which sets national rules for
arbitration proceedings.
Most large companies that operate across
state borders prefer a uniform federal
standard to enforce agreements requiring
arbitration of disputes.
They contend that it is unwieldy to deal with
the many, often conflicting state standards.
Many employees want the protections
offered under state laws, which sometimes
permit filing lawsuits even when there are
arbitration agreements.
Businesses generally prefer to take their
chances with arbitration rather than risk
exposure to potentially huge jury awards
against them.
The case under review involves Circuit City
Stores Inc. Since 1995, the Richmond, Va.,
company has required job applicants to sign a
binding-arbitration agreement that covers all
disputes with the company. On Oct. 23, 1995,
Saint Clair Adams signed such an agreement,
but two years later he sued Circuit City in
state court in California over certain
employment-related claims.
The company filed a petition in U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California
to block the lawsuit and compel arbitration
under the agreement.
The U.S. District Court sided with Circuit
City, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, reversed that
ruling.
The circuit court said that the Federal
Arbitration Act doesn't cover labor or
employment contracts. As a result, the court
ruled, Mr. Adams could pursue his case in
state court.
Circuit City, in its filing to the Supreme
Court, argued that under such a ruling, "no
agreement to arbitrate disputes entered into
by an employer and employee may be
enforced" under the Federal Arbitration Act.
The company argued that nearly all other
circuit courts that have addressed the issue
concluded that the coverage exclusion under
the law is a narrow one, limited to workers
who actually move goods across state lines.
Mr. Adams's attorney, Scott Kronland, said
that the Ninth Circuit's decision may disagree
with other rulings by U.S. circuit courts, but
that recent scholarship in the area shows that
the Ninth Circuit decision more accurately
reflects the intent of Congress.
"The states should be able to adopt
reasonable regulations to protect employees,"
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said Mr. Kronland. "We're seeing more and
more employees being forced to sign
agreements that waive their right to go to
court and have their claims considered by a
court and a jury in many cases."
The Supreme Court is expected to rule on
the case sometime next fall. (Circuit City vs.
Adams)
Copyright C 2000 The New York Times
Company
131
SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE SR CASE
Arbitration Key to Circuit City Suit
The Santa Rosa Press Democrat
Tuesday, May 23, 2000
Mary Fricker
The U.S. Supreme Court said Monday it
will decide whether employees can be
required under federal law to arbitrate
workplace disputes, an issue that rises from a
workplace harassment lawsuit against Circuit
City in Santa Rosa.
The decision is important because
employers increasingly require workers to
agree to binding arbitration, and for some
multistate employers it would be easier to rely
on one federal law to enforce the agreements
than to have different laws in 50 states.
Most federal appeals courts have ruled
the Federal Arbitration Act does apply, but
the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San
Francisco ruled in the Santa Rosa case in
November that it does not. The Supreme
Court will resolve that conflict.
"It's basically a federalism issue. Is
employment something that should be
decided in federal or state courts?" said
Steven L. Robinson, a San Francisco attorney
with Alioto & Alioto who represents former
Circuit City employee St. Clair Adams.
The narrow issue of federal or state
jurisdiction evolved out of a case filed by
Adams in 1997 in Sonoma County Superior
Court. The harassment issues that he raised in
his case are on hold pending a decision on
jurisdiction.
Adams, who now lives in San Diego,
lived in Santa Rosa from 1993 to 1998. He
was a salesman at Circuit City for 14 months
in 1995 and 1996. When he was hired, he
signed an agreement to submit all claims and
disputes to mutually binding arbitration.
Adams said that while at Circuit City,
some co-workers and supervisors often made
sexual comments regarding customers and
others and he found them inappropriate. He
said managers ignored his complaints until he
threatened to get an attorney, and when they
did investigate, co-workers retaliated against
him. The stress was so intense his doctor
advised him to quit, he said.
"The work environment became so
hostile, I couldn't work there," he said.
Adams sued Circuit City under the
California Fair Employment and Housing
Act, saying the firm forced him to quit and
had a hostile work environment.
Circuit City denied the allegations and
said the Federal Arbitration Act required the
dispute be handled through arbitration.
Circuit City, headquartered in Richmond, Va.,
has 618 stores and more than 55,000
employees in 46 states.
"What's in question here is an alternative
dispute resolution program that provides
quick, fair, final and inexpensive binding
resolutions to long-delayed, expensive court
procedures," said company spokesman
Morgan Stewart.
Robinson said he and San Francisco
attorney Angela Alioto took the case because
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they believed the binding arbitration was not
enforceable, because the wording was too
favorable to the employer and because
Adams had earlier asked his managers for
arbitration and they refused.
A federal court stayed the Superior Court
If the Supreme Court rules for Adams,
the case could be returned to Superior Court
for a jury trial, which is Adams' goal, his
attorney said. If not, the case could go to
arbitration or the Supreme Court could issue
other instructions.
A decision is expected by June 2001.
Adams said the experience has turned
him into a civil rights activist.
In 1998, he served for more than a year
on the West County Community Action
Committee, created by the Sonoma County
Commission on Human Rights to prevent
hate crimes. And in San Diego he has
founded and is chairman of the Coalition for
Civil Rights, which he said addresses a variety
of civil rights issues.
"It wasn't until after this whole thing
happened that I became active," said Adams,
who is gay. "I felt it was a way of recovering,
a way to empower myself."
The case is Circuit City Stores vs. Adams,
99-137.
case pending a final ruling on the arbitration
dispute. The U.S. District Court in San
Francisco ruled in Circuit City's favor, but on
appeal the 9 h Circuit found in Adams' favor.
Copyright C 2000 The New York Times
Company
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EMPLOYERS AWAIT RULING IN ARBITRATION CASE
Business Insurance
Monday, May29, 2000
Mark A. Hofnann
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court's
decision to review a California employment law
case has significant ramifications nationwide for
employers that require their employees to sign
arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment.
The case, Circuit City Stores Inc. vs. Saint
Clair Adams, involves the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act, which took effect in 1925. The
act pernits contracts with binding arbitration
agreements to supersede state law, with one
exemption. The exemption holds that "nothing
herein shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."
Accordingly, federal and state courts have
held that the law, which seeks to encourage
arbitration, applies to employment and labor
contracts covering those workers who are not
specifically exempted.
"The act really carves out certain types of
employees, but basically applies to everyone
else in all work categories so they can be bound
by binding arbitration," said Robert E. Meade,
senior vp of the American Arbitration Assn. in
New York.
But a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals in Pasadena, Calif.,
broke with the usual reading of the law last
November, ruling in the Circuit City case that
the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to
employment contracts. Richmond, Va.-based
Circuit City Stores appealed, and the high court
agreed last week to review the case.
The court's decision to review the case
drew praise from an influential employers'
group.
"I'm pleased that the court has decided to
resolve the conflict" over whether the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to employment
contracts, said Sussan Mahallati Kysela, labor
and employment counsel for the National
Chamber Litigation Center Inc., which is the
legal arm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in
Washington.
The case began when Saint Clair Adams
filed a lawsuit against Circuit City in state court
in November 1997, alleging that he had been
the victim of workplace harassment at a Santa
Rosa, Calif., Circuit City store. Mr. Adams' suit
was based on the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act.
But Mr. Adams had signed a "dispute
resolution agreement" as part of his job
application two years earlier. The agreement
required that employees submit all claims and
disputes to mutually agreeable binding
arbitration. Circuit City sought to have the
arbitration agreement enforced, and a U.S.
court granted summary judgment in the
employer's favor in May 1998. Mr. Adams
appealed, and the appeals court panel -- citing
the 9th Circuit's May 1999 decision in Craft vs.
Campbell Soup Co. -- held that the Federal
Arbitration Act does not apply to any
employment or labor contracts.
Circuit City appealed to the Supreme Court.
In its brief seeking review, the employer noted
that the 9th Circuit's Craft decision was
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"contrary to every other federal appellate court"
by holding that the act's exemption "must be
read broadly to exclude coverage of all
contracts of employment."
Instead, the brief holds, looking at the law,
the "more logical view" of the act's scope is that
"Congress had in mind specific transportation
workers for whom special arbitration legislation
already existed."
- The brief for Mr. Adams specifically
disputes that interpretation, noting that
Congress did not view its authority over
employment relationships very broadly at all 75
years ago. "Viewed from the perspective of
1925, the decision by Congress" that Circuit
City holds -- "limiting FAA's coverage only to
those employment contracts least evidently
within the reach of federal authority -- would
have been a curious choice indeed," the brief
notes.
Outside observers say much is riding on the
high court's decision to accept the Circuit City
case. The Supreme Court last looked at the
Federal Arbitration Act in 1991 in Gilmer vs.
Interstate/Johnson, but it did not elaborate on
the "interplay" between the Federal Arbitration
Act and anti-discrimination laws, said William
Schaller, a partner in the Chicago law firm of
Baker & McKenzie.
"The more precise question is there's a
provision in the FAA's Section 1 that seems to
exempt from its scope employees, but a lot of
the cases have dealt with employees who
actually work in interstate commerce," said Mr.
Schaller, who noted that lower courts have
tended to view the exemption very narrowly.
If the high court agrees with the 9th Circuit,
the decision "might have a profound effect in
limiting the availability of arbitration," Mr.
Schaller said. But, he said, "it's vastly more
likely" that the justices will continue to read the
exemption narrowly and allow the Federal
Arbitration Act to apply to cases brought under
federal anti-discrimination laws.
Still, he said, "I think it's fair to say that, at
the time the act was written, it did not
contemplate anything like current anti-
discrimination law.'
Copyright D 2000 Crain Communcations Inc.
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EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 17; LOCAL 1503, UNITED MINE
WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees.
Arbitration rules.
David P. Primack*
Deference to an arbitrator's decision in a labor dispute has long been a staple of the American
jurisprudence, but what if, in the employer's opinion, the arbitrator's decision could end up in putting
other people in danger by keeping a worker employed? This is the issue that the Supreme Court will
face this fall when it takes a hard look at Arbitrator Barrett's ruling in the dispute between the Eastern
Associated Coal Company (Eastern) and the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA).
In 1996, James Smith, who was a drilling operator with Eastern, applied for a vacancy in the
Mobile Equipment Operators (MEO) division of the company. Among other duties, MEOs operate
vehicles with gross vehicle weights from 32,000 to 55,000 pounds on public roads and highways. A
driver must have a commercial driver's license (CDL) to operate vehicles of this large size. According
to Department of Transportation regulations, a person with a CDL must submit to random drug
testing, and in March of 1996, James Smith tested positive to the presence of cannabinoids. Eastern
suspended and then discharged Smith. Smith filed a grievance challenging his discharge and in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the matter was sent to arbitration. Arbitrator
Ross ruled that Smith be allowed to return to work after: a 30-day suspension without back pay,
participation in a substance abuse program, and submission to random drug testing at the discretion of
Eastern. After having tested negative for drugs three times, Smith tested positive for cannabinoids in
June 1997. Eastern suspended and then discharged him, and Smith filed another grievance that was
then submitted to Arbitrator Barrett.
According to the collective bargaining agreement, Eastern has the exclusive right to hire and
discharge employees, except that no employee may be disciplined or discharged except for just cause.
Smith argued that except for these two incidents, he has had an exemplary 17-year employment record
with Eastern, and it was a personal/family problem that the caused this latest lapse. Finding Smith's
testimony credible, Arbitrator Barrett ruled that Smith be reinstated to work under the same conditions
as the previous arbitration ruling with the added condition that if he tests positive again he would be
summarily dismissed. Eastern filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia asking that the arbitration award be vacated because it violates public policy, fails to draw
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and oversteps its authority because Eastern had
just cause for discharging Smith. Both the district court and the United States Appeals Court for the
Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed with Eastern's contention.
In upholding the arbitrator's ruling, District Court Judge John Copenhaver, Jr. pointed out this
collective bargaining agreement does not call for mandatory discharge for violation of a drug test and
does not specify the conduct that constitutes just cause for dismissal. Because of these two facts, the
arbitrator may look to other sources for guidance including the rules and regulations of Eastern, which
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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in this case, do not make failing a drug test a mandatory dismissal as well. According to Judge
Copenhaver, Arbitrator Barrett interpreted the collective bargaining agreement to allow for suspension
and discipline and this is "rationally inferable" from the language of the agreement.
Under Supreme Court precedent, a federal court must find that an arbitrator's decision violates
some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant in order to vacate it on public policy
grounds. Eastern contended that the safety of the public not to have people who take illegal drugs
while driving heavy machinery on the roads is just that sort of public policy. Judge Copenhaver agreed
that there is indeed that public policy concern, but concluded that there is no explicit and well-defined
public policy that mandates dismissal after having tested positive for drugs. Accordingly, given the
strong presumption not to overturn arbitration rulings, the court found against Eastern. The Fourth
Circuit, in a short decision, found that the District court correctly decided the issues before it. The
Supreme Court will have to determine whether or not public policy in this case overrides the merciful
judgment of an arbitrator.
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99-1038 Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,
District 17
Ruling below: (4' Cir., 8/20/99):
Labor arbitration award reinstating to safety-sensitive position employee who had tested positive for
illegal drugs was properly upheld by district court on grounds that (i) because neither collective
bargaining agreement nor employer's substance abuse policy mandates discharge as punishment for
employees who test positive for illegal drugs, arbitrator rationally could have concluded that there was
not "just cause" for discharge as required by collective bargaining agreement, and (ii) while there is
public policy against use of illegal drugs by those in safety-sensitive position, there is no well defined
and dominant public policy against reinstatement of employees who have used illegal drugs in the past.
Questions presented: (1) Is there well defined and dominant public policy that prohibits enforcement
of arbitration awards requiring reinstatement to safety-sensitive positions of employees who test
positive for illegal drugs, as First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or, as Second,
Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and now Fourth Circuits have held, does no such policy exist and must courts
therefore uphold reinstatement to safety-sensitive positions of those who test positive for illegal drugs?
(2) Should arbitration award be vacated on public policy grounds only when award itself violates
positive law or requires unlawful conduct by employer, as Fourth, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits have held, or, as First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, may such
award violate public policy without violating positive law - question on which this court granted
certiorari, but did not reach, in United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)?
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EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORP., Plaintiff
V.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 17, AND
LOCAL UNION NO. 1503, Defendants
United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia
Charleston Division
September 30, 1998, Decided
COPENHAVER, J., United States District
Judge.
This matter is before the court on cross
motions for summary judgment filed by the
parties pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C J
185. Plaintiff seeks vacation of an arbitration
award. Defendants oppose vacation of the award
and seek to have the award confirmed and
enforced by the court.
I. Background
The following facts are not disputed by the
parties. Plaintiff Eastern Associated Coal
Corporation ("Eastern") and defendants United
Mine Workers of America, District 17, and
United Mine Workers of America Local Union
1503 (collectively, "UMWA"), are parties to a
collective bargaining agreement known as the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1993 (the "Wage Agreement"). Article IA,
Section (d) of the Wage Agreement reserves to
Eastern the exclusive right to hire and discharge
employees. *** The right of Eastern to discharge
employees is limited, however, by Article XXIV,
Section (a) of the Wage Agreement, which
provides that "no employee covered by this
Agreement may be disciplined or discharged
except for just cause." (Id.). Article XXIV,
Section (d)(3) of the Wage Agreement applies to
those situations where an employee grieves a
discharge and the case proceeds to arbitration.
Under such circumstances, Section (d)(3)
mandates that:
If the arbitrator determines that the
Employer has failed to establish just cause
for the Employee's discharge, the Employee
shall be immediately reinstated to his job. If
the arbitrator determines that there was just
cause for the discharge, the discharge shall
become effective upon the date of the
arbitrator's decision.
Eastern employs a road crew charged with
maintaining its mine haulage roads. Members of
the road crew hold positions with the company
known as Mobile Equipment Operators
("MEO"). Included within the duties performed
by MEOs is the operation of equipment having
gross vehicle weights ranging from 32,000 to
55,000 pounds on public roads and highways.
Operators of such equipment are required to
have a commercial driver's license ("CDL") and
are subject to certain sections of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations promulgated by
the United States Department of Transportation
(the "DOT Regulations"). Eastern implemented
a random drug testing policy for its MEO staff in
accordance with the DOT Regulations.
In early 1996, James Smith, a drilling
operator with Eastern, posted for a vacant MEO
position and was eventually hired. In conjunction
with his new position, Mr. Smith was required to
have a CDL in order to carry out the duties of
the job. Pursuant to the DOT Regulations, Mr.
Smith was subjected to a random drug test on
March 25, 1996. He tested positive for the
presence of cannabinoids. In accordance with
Article XXIV of the Wage Agreement, Eastern
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initially suspended Mr. Smith with the intent to
discharge and then discharged him. Mr. Smith
filed a grievance challenging his discharge and
the case proceeded to arbitration.
Arbitrator Jerome H. Ross heard the case and
issued an award on April 18, 1996, returning Mr.
Smith to work after a 30-day suspension without
back pay and requiring Mr. Smith to participate
in a substance abuse program. In addition, the
arbitrator's award required Mr. Smith to submit
to random drug testing at the discretion of either
Eastern or some other approved substance abuse
professional for a period of five years.
Mr. Smith was randomly tested again on
April 24, 1996, October 11, 1996, and January
27, 1997; each time he tested negative for illegal
drug use. On June 27, 1997, Mr. Smith was
randomly tested at which time he tested positive
for cannabinoids. Eastern again suspended Mr.
Smith with intent to discharge and subsequently
discharged him. Mr. Smith grieved his discharge
and the case proceeded to arbitration in front of
Arbitrator Jerome T. Barrett.
The issues before Arbitrator Barrett were
framed as follows: (1) "Was the suspension with
intent to discharge of grievant James Smith on
July 14, 1997 for just cause?" and (2) "And if not,
what is the appropriate remedy?" ***
Arbitrator Barrett identified the pertinent
portions of the Wage Agreement as follows: (1)
Article 1A, Section (d) which reserves to Eastern
the exclusive right to hire and discharge its
working force; (2) Article III, Section (a) which
grants all employees the right to a safe and
healthful work environment; (3) Article III,
Section (g) which requires Eastern employees to
comply with reasonable rules and regulations of
Eastern so long as such rules or regulations do
not conflict with state and federal laws; and (4)
Article XXIV, Sections (a) through (d) regarding
Eastern's discharge, grievance and arbitration
procedures. ***
Eastern argued at the arbitration hearing that
it had just cause to discharge Mr. Smith as a
result of his testing positive for drug use on two
separate occasions during a sixteen month period
in which time he was employed as a heavy
equipment operator. *** Eastern argued that the
DOT Regulations and its own internal drug
policy were implemented to curb drug use by
employees occupying safety sensitive positions.
*** According to the company, Mr. Smith's drug
use jeopardized the safety of other Eastern
employees as well as the public at large and made
his discharge just under the circumstances.
The company further argued that it was proper
to discharge Mr. Smith in order to send a clear
message to all Eastern employees of the
company's serious stance against employee drug
use. ***
The UMWA countered by citing to Mr.
Smith's employment record, noting that the two
failed drug tests were the only bad marks on an
otherwise exemplary 17-year employment history
with Eastern. *** The UMWA argued that
discharge was too severe a penalty given Mr.
Smith's long-term service with Eastern. (Id.).
Moreover, the union argued that neither
Eastern's drug policy nor the DOT Regulations
required mandatory discharge of an employee
under these circumstances. ***
After summarizing the testimony adduced at
a hearing held on July 28, 1997, and the positions
of the parties, Arbitrator Barrett found that:
It is understandable why the company wants
to put an end to the matter by discharging
grievant. The liability the company faces
when an employee assigned to operate
company equipment on public roads is found
with drugs in his urine is very real. As is the
cost of a second arbitration for the same
employee on the same issue within a sixteen
month period.
Having been an otherwise solid employee for a
significant period of time is certainly in grievant's
favor. However, grievant got full credit for his
good record in the earlier arbitration. Also to his
credit in the earlier case, he was found to be a
recreational user of illegal drugs and not an
addicted user. Being rescued by an arbitrator
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from losing his job in 1996 and having to face an
invasive program of rehabilitation would seem to
have provided unambiguous notice of the need
to correct his behavior. It should have been
interpreted as a clear message that drug use and
secure employment do not mix.
Grievant made a very personal appeal under oath
to the arbitrator concerning a personal/family
problem which caused this one time lapse in drug
usage. The arbitrator found this testimony
creditable [sic]. If the arbitrator was misled by the
grievant, the arbitrator is confident that the
grievant will make another misstep with drug use
and be caught. The remedy provided here will
assure that the company and union will not be
required to use arbitration again for this grievant
where drugs are involved. ***
Arbitrator Barrett issued an award
suspending Mr. Smith until October 20, 1997,
and then reinstating him, subject to the following
conditions:
1. No back pay for any loss during this
suspension.
2. The award by Arbitrator Ross in CAS No.
93-17-96-472 is reinstated.
3. Grievant will reimburse the company and
the union for the arbitrators' bills in both the
Ross case and the instant case.
4. Grievant will provide the union and
company with a signed, undated letter of
resignation which the company may date and
accept if grievant tests positive for any illegal
drug in the next five years.
5. During the grievant's suspension period,
grievant's name shall remain in the company's
random drug testing program. If grievant
fails to take a required test during his
suspension, the company can date and accept
his resignation letter.
6. The company and union may agree that
unusual or unforeseen circumstances justify
waiving any conditions set forth above.
In its motion for summary judgment, Eastern
seeks vacation of the award on the grounds that
the award is contrary to public policy and that it
fails to draw its essence from the Wage
Agreement. In addition, Eastern contends that
Arbitrator Barrett exceeded the authority granted
to him pursuant to the Wage Agreement by
failing to address the issue of whether Eastern
had just cause to discharge Mr. Smith. The
UMWA contends in its summary judgment
motion that the award did not contravene any
well defined and dominant public policy and was
based upon the arbitrator's interpretation of the
contract so as to draw its essence from the Wage
Agreement. Accordingly, the UMWA seeks
enforcement of the award.
II. Discussion
It is well settled that courts overwhelmingly
defer to the arbitrator's resolution of a labor
dispute. Under the United States Supreme
Court's Steelworkers Trilogy, it is clear that
judicial review of labor arbitration awards under
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C f 185, is extremely limited. *** In
restricting judicial review, the Court has
emphasized:
The question of interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement is a question
for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's
construction which was bargained for; and so
far as the arbitrator's decision concerns
construction of the contract, the courts have
no business overruling him because their
interpretation of the contract is different
from his. ***
Consequently, courts are not authorized to
reconsider the merits of an arbitration award
despite allegations by the parties that the award is
based upon erroneous facts or a
misinterpretation of the underlying contract.
United Papernorkers Int'1 Union v. Misco, Inc., ***
"As long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision." ***
Nevertheless, the arbitrator may not "ignore
the plain language of the contract." *** Rather,
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the arbitrator's award "must draw its essence
from the contract and cannot simply reflect the
arbitrator's own notions of industrial justice." ***
An award fails to draw its essence from the
contract "if the arbitrator must have based his
award on his own personal notions of right and
wrong", *** or is not "rationally inferable" or "in
some logical way" derived from the collective
bargaining agreement *** An award does not
draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement if the award conflicts with the express
terms of the contract, *** or the meaning given
to clear and unequivocal contract language by the
arbitrator is "other than that expressed by the
agreement." ***
In determining whether an award draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement,
it is also appropriate to consider whether the
arbitrator exceeded his contractual authority. *
When a collective bargaining agreement provides
that disciplinary rights are reserved exclusively to
management, and specifies conduct that warrants
discharge, the arbitrator may not infringe on
those rights by modifying the discipline imposed.
Warnor & Gulf Navgation Co. v. United Steelworkers
of America, *** (where agreement provides for
immediate discharge of employee who tests
positive for drugs a second time, arbitrator, on
finding that second positive test was legitimate,
may not reduce penalty to disciplinary
suspension); Delta Queen, *** (where agreement
reserves to management the sole responsibility to
discipline and discharge for proper cause, such as
carelessness, and the arbitrator finds "grossly
careless" conduct by discharged employee, the
arbitrator may not award reinstatement
notwithstanding his belief that discharge was
unfair in light of the employee's long-standing
service); Georgia-Pacific, *** (where agreement
provides for immediate discharge for dishonesty
and arbitrator makes factual finding of
dishonesty, he may not award reinstatement on
the reasoning that employee's years of faithful
performance constitute a "countervailing factor"
entitling him to at least one opportunity to
correct his ways before being discharged).
In those instances where the collective
bargaining agreement does not specify the
conduct that constitutes cause for discharge,
arbitrators may look to other sources for
guidance. Among the sources deemed to be an
integral part of the agreement are management
work rules and disciplinary enforcement policies
and practices. *** Brgham & Women's Hosp. v.
Massachusetts Nures Assoc., *** (where agreement
gave employer right to discharge for "just cause,"
arbitrator properly looked to hospital's
disciplinary policy to determine meaning of the
term). Indeed, it is held that where the collective
bargaining agreement reserves to management
the right to make and enforce disciplinary rules,
rules promulgated pursuant to that authority are
thus incorporated into the collective bargaining
agreement and have "the force of contract
language." *** Where a collective bargaining
agreement reserves to management the right to
establish reasonable rules and regulations and the
right to discharge for cause, but does not set out
what constitutes just cause, it is proper for the
arbitrator to look to company rules and
regulations to determine whether or not a
discharge was warranted. ***
Here, the collective bargaining agreement
between Eastern and the UMWA reserves to
Eastern the right to implement reasonable rules
and regulations not inconsistent with federal and
state laws. Eastern's drug policy was
implemented by the company in accordance with
its reserved right to implement rules and
regulations. Consequently, it must be deemed an
integral part of the collective bargaining
agreement. *** For its part, Eastern has asserted
as much in its brief before the court. Moreover,
the UMWA has not challenged Eastern's right
under the collective bargaining agreement to
impose the drug policy, adopted by Eastern
primarily for the purpose of complying with the
DOT Regulations. In fact, the UMWA relied
upon the drug policy during the arbitration
proceeding as support for its position that
discharge was inappropriate under the
circumstances.
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Under the Wage Agreement, Eastern has the
exclusive right to direct its work force, including
the right to hire and discharge its employees.
Eastern's right to discharge employees is limited,
however, to those situations where the company
has just cause. The term "just cause" is not
defined in the Wage Agreement itself. Thus,
Arbitrator Barrett was obligated to look to other
sources, including the company's substance abuse
policy, for guidance in determining whether Mr.
Smith's discharge was warranted. Eastern's
substance abuse policy requires that an employee
who tests positive for drugs be "removed from
any safety sensitive position and subject to
disciplinary action up to and including
termination." ***
Having decided that the substance abuse
policy is an integral part of the Wage Agreement,
any decision made by the arbitrator pursuant to
the disciplinary standard set forth within the
company's substance abuse policy would be
appropriate. Although Arbitrator Barrett did not
specifically find the existence of just cause to
discharge Mr. Smith, a reading of his entire
opinion leads the court to conclude that he
found just cause to discipline Mr. Smith, in
accordance with the terms of the substance abuse
policy. Specifically, Arbitrator Barrett suspended
Mr. Smith for two and one-half months without
pay, then reinstated him subject to several
conditions, including continuation of random
drug testing for a period of five years as well as
mandatory resignation in the event of any future
positive drug test. Based upon this award, it
appears as though Arbitrator Barrett interpreted
the substance abuse policy to allow for
suspension and discipline. Inasmuch as the
substance abuse policy calls for the removal of
employees in safety sensitive positions, but does
not call for mandatory discharge, the court finds
that the arbitrator's award, suspending Mr. Smith
for two and one-half months without pay, and
reinstating him subject to strict conditions, is
"rationally inferable" from the Wage Agreement.
Having found that the award is rationally
inferable from the Wage Agreement, the court
does not find that Arbitrator Barrett exceeded his
authority under the agreement.
Eastern argues that Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'1 Union, *** is
controlling in this action, and requires the court
to vacate the arbitrator's award on the ground
that it represents the arbitrator's own brand of
industrial justice and does not draw its essence
from the Wage Agreement. However, the facts
of this case are to be distinguished from those
before the court in Mountaineer. In
Mountaineer, the company's substance abuse
policy contained a provision requiring immediate
termination of any employee testing positive for
drug use. Here, Eastern's substance abuse policy
does not require mandatory termination. Rather,
the policy requires discipline "up to and including
termination." The disciplinary standard
embodied within Eastern's substance abuse
policy differentiates this case from Mountaineer.
Accordingly, the court finds that Arbitrator
Barrett's award draws its essence from the Wage
Agreement and does not represent his own
"brand of industrial justice."
Eastern also argues that Arbitrator Barrett's
award should be set aside on public policy
grounds. The question of public policy is
"ultimately one for resolution by the courts." ***
However, courts should be reluctant to vacate
arbitration awards on public policy grounds. ***
Therefore, an arbitrator's award should be set
aside only in those situations "where the contract
as interpreted would violate 'some explicit public
policy' that is 'well defined and dominant"'. *** A
well defined and dominant public policy is one
that may "be ascertained by reference to the laws
and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests." ***
Consequently, a "formulation of public policy
based only on 'general considerations of
supposed public interests' is not the sort that
permits a court to set aside an arbitration award
that was entered in accordance with a valid
collective-bargaining agreement." *** Thus, to
vacate an arbitration award on public policy
grounds, the court must find that "an explicit,
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well defined and dominant public policy exists
and the policy is one that specifically militates
against the relief ordered by the arbitrator."
In this action, Eastern argues that the DOT
Regulations articulate a well defined and
dominant public policy against the operation of
dangerous machinery by employees who test
positive for drug use. The DOT Regulations
were promulgated to encourage employers "to
establish programs designed to help prevent
accidents and injuries resulting from the misuse
of alcohol or use of controlled substances by
drivers of commercial motor vehicles." ***
According to Eastern, the DOT Regulations
were enacted primarily to protect the public from
injury and necessarily cover those situations
where an employee tests positive for drug use
despite a lack of evidence that he was under the
influence of drugs while operating heavy
equipment.
The court must first determine whether or
not there is a well defined and dominant public
policy militating against the arbitrator's decision
in this case. There is a plentitude of positive law
to support the existence of a well defined and
dominant public policy against the performance
of safety sensitive jobs by employees under the
influence of drugs. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Indus.
Workers Union v. Exxon Corp., 991 F.2d 244, 252-
53 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that numerous
statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions
"pronounce the emphatic national desire to
eradicate illicit drugs from the workplace,"
particularly in safety sensitive occupations);
Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers
Union, 77 F.3d 850, 855-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding
within the Federal Railroad Administration
regulations a well defined and dominant public
policy against the performance of safety sensitive
jobs while under the influence of drugs); Union
Pacific RR. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255,
262 (8th Cir. 1993) (court concluded that Federal
Railroad Administration regulations incorporate a
well defined and dominant public policy against
permitting railroad employees to perform their
jobs while under the influence of intoxicants);
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l,
861 E2d 665, 674 (11th Cir. 1988) (court
recognized clear established public policy
contained within Federal Aviation
Administration regulations condemning
operation of passenger airliners by pilots under
the influence of drugs or alcohol).
Additionally, there is legal precedent which
expands this public policy from situations where
the employee is shown to be under the influence
of drugs to situations where the employee merely
tests positive for drugs although there is no
evidence that he was under the influence while
on the job. See Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers'
Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that reinstatement of employee in safety sensitive
job who failed drug test violated public policy
embodied within the Drug-Free Workplace Act
despite lack of evidence that employee was under
influence of drugs at work); Exxon Corp. v. Baton
Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850,
856 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that allowing
employee to collect back pay would contravene
public policy contained within Federal Railroad
Administration regulations despite the absence of
any evidence that employee had actually
performed his job while drug-impaired).
Based upon the foregoing, the court finds
that a well defined and dominant public policy
exists against the use of controlled substances by
those who perform safety sensitive jobs. Thus,
Eastern has satisfactorily negotiated the first step
of the public policy analysis. To abandon
Arbitrator Barrett's award as contrary to public
policy, however, the court must also find that his
award of reinstatement contravenes the identified
policy. Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers Union, Inc.,
118 F.3d at 849. Eastern argues that the public
policy embodied in the DOT Regulations is
sufficiently well defined and dominant to support
vacation of Arbitrator Barrett's award. There is
no question that the DOT Regulations relied
upon by Eastern articulate a well defined and
dominant public policy against drug use by
persons employed as commercial motor vehicle
drivers. n6 Nevertheless, the DOT Regulations
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do not express an explicit, well defined public
policy permanently enjoining the employment of
commercial motor vehicle drivers who test
positive for drug use. Specifically, the DOT
Regulations do not require that employees who
test positive for drug use be automatically
discharged. Here, the arbitrator ordered
reinstatement of Mr. Smith, subject, however, to
several conditions, including continued random
drug testing and mandatory resignation in the
event of a future positive drug test. Because the
DOT Regulations do not make it illegal to
reinstate employees who test positive for drug
use, it cannot be said that the DOT Regulations
"specifically militate against the relief ordered by
the arbitrator" in this case. *** Consequently,
the public policy exception does not apply
inasmuch as the arbitrator's award is consistent
with the DOT Regulations.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, it is ORDERED that
defendants' motion for summary judgment be,
and it hereby is, granted. Accordingly, it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment be, and it hereby is, denied.
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SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE IF ARBITRATORS HAVE FINAL WORD IN DRUG-
RELATED FIRINGS
Workplace Substance Abuse Advisor
April 7,2000
It's up to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide
if and when courts can overturn an arbitrator's
ruling, after a company lost its bid to fire an
employee who tested positive for drugs.
Background: While working as a drilling
operator for Eastern Associated Coal Corp. in
1996, James Smith applied for a position as a
mobile equipment operator. The job required a
commercial driver's license. After he was hired,
Smith had to submit to a random drug test,
which was positive for cannabinoids. Eastern
suspended, then discharged him.
An arbitrator ordered Smith reinstated after
a 30-day suspension without back pay, required
him to participate in a substance abuse program
and to required him to submit to random drug
tests. Subsequent drug tests were negative until
June 1997, when he again tested positive for
cannabinoids. Eastern again suspended, then
discharged him. Smith filed a grievance and the
case went to another arbitrator. In his defense,
the United Mine Workers of America cited
Smith's 17-year employment history with
Eastern, which was exemplary, except for the
two failed drug tests. Smith told the arbitrator
his drug use was a one-time lapse due to a
personal problem.
The arbitrator ordered Smith suspended
then reinstated, with several conditions:
He would receive no back pay.
Smith would give the union and company a
signed, undated resignation letter which the
company could date and accept if he tested
positive for any illegal drug in the next 5 years.
He would be included in random drug
testing during the initial suspension, and a
positive drug test during that time would be
grounds for Eastern to date and accept the
resignation letter.
Rulings: The company filed suit against the
UMWA. A district court said it was a well
established practice for the courts to
overwhelmingly defer to the arbitrator's
resolution of a labor dispute, and ruled against
the company. The court said the Department of
Transportation's regulations against drug use do
not dictate that safety sensitive employees be
automatically discharged for positive tests.
It also noted the arbitrator included several
conditions for Smith's reinstatement. An
appeals court later concurred with the district
court.
"We took what we believe to be the fairly
common sense approach that employees who
test positive should not be operating in safety
sensitive positions," said Vic Svec, a spokesman
for the Peabody Group, the parent company of
Eastern in West Virginia.
The arbitrator's decision essentially said the
employee should be reinstated, but immediately
discharged upon a third positive random drug
test. "We didn't know if that third incident
might involve a school bus load of kids," Svec
said. "It struck us as a scary proposition, both
as a liability issue and a public safety issue."
Company attorneys said federal appeals
courts have disagreed over the point at which
courts can overturn arbitration awards.
An attorney for the United Mine Workers
asked the court to reject the company's appeal,
and said while there is a public policy against
drug-impaired workers performing safety-
sensitive jobs, the courts should approach such
matters on a case-by-case basis.
Copyright 02000 LPR Publications
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HIGH COURT TO HEAR CASE ABOUT DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE
Order to Rehire Worker Raises Safety Issues
The Houston Chronicle
Tuesday, March 21,2000
Steve Lash
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court
agreed Monday to consider whether companies
must comply with a labor arbitrator's order to
put a heavy-equipment operator back on the
job even after the worker flunked drug tests
twice.
At the same time, the justices declined to
hear an appeal in which public school officials,
aiming for racially diverse facilities and
programs, want to use a student's race when
deciding who will attend schools for gifted
children.
The drugs-in-the-workplace case evolved
from a decision in the late 1990s by Eastern
Associated Coal Corp. to fire James Smith, a
mobile drill operator, twice after he tested
positive for marijuana.
Both times an arbitrator ordered the
company to reinstate Smith, citing a union
agreement with the West Virginia company and
the absence of any law prohibiting his
reinstatement.
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the arbitrator.
In its Supreme Court appeal, the company
urged the justices to use common sense and
rule that its refusal to put Smith back to work is
justified by public safety concerns.
"It makes a mockery of the public policy. .
to require the employer - and the public - to
shoulder the risk that Smith's third strike might
be discovered by sifting through the rubble of
an accident involving Smith's 55,000-pound
truck," the company argued.
The Department of Labor reports that
more than 5,000 people die annually from
work-related injuries, and 47 percent of the
deaths are drug-related. In addition, the agency
said, employees who use drugs are 3.6 times
more likely to be in a workplace accident.
The United Mine Workers of America,
pressing Smith's case, countered that companies
are legally bound to respect an arbitrator's
decision so long as it is legally sound.
The court is expected to hear arguments in
the case this fall or winter and render its
decision by July 2001. ***
Copyright 02000 The Houston Chronicle
Publishing Company.
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COURT TO HEAR DRUGS-WORKPLACE CASE
United Press International
Monday, March 20,2000
Aichael Kirkland
WASHINGTON, March 20 (UPI) -- The
Supreme Court Monday agreed to hear
arguments next term on whether an employer
can be forced to reinstate an employee who has
tested positive for drugs or alcohol, even if the
employee's job is "safety sensitive."
The case involves a West Virginia miner
who was operating heavy equipment.
In a petition to the Supreme Court, Eastern
Associated Coal Corp., a coal mining company,
said some of its employees are required to
operate heavy equipment, including 55,000-
pound trucks, on public roads.
Drivers of such equipment are called
mobile equipment operators, MEOs, and are
required to have a commercial driver's license.
The U.S. Department of Transportation
requires drug and alcohol testing for such
licenses, both when an employee applies and
randomly thereafter.
Employee James Smith, a drill operator,
applied for an MEO position in 1996, but he
tested positive for traces of marijuana. Under
the terms of a labor contract with the United
Mine Workers, Smith was suspended, and the
company eventually fired him.
Smith filed a union grievance, and an
arbitrator ruled that he could return to work
after a 30-day suspension.
In June 1997, however, Smith's fifth
random test as an MEO again showed positive
results for marijuana, and he was again
suspended and discharged. Once again, Smith
took his grievance to arbitration.
Though Arbitrator Jerome Bennett said that
the company's "liability.. .when an employee
assigned to operate company equipment on
public road is found with drugs in his urine is
very real," he again ruled in Smith's favor. The
arbitrator said he believed Smith's testimony
that his behavior was a one-time lapse caused
by a "personal/family problem," and reinstated
him as an MEO.
A federal judge in Charleston, W.Va.,
upheld the arbitrator, and the judge was upheld
by a federal appeals court.
The company then asked the Supreme
Court for review, saying it should "make clear
that public policy prohibits forced
reinstatement of drug abusers to safety sensitive
positions -- where they might endanger the lives
of others -- even if such reinstatement is not
illegal per se."
The United Mine Workers opposed review,
but will be arguing the other side when the case
is heard, probably sometime next fall.
Copyright 02000 UPI
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BRENTWOOD ACADEMY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION; et al., Defendants-
Appellants.
High School Football is Now Supreme Court Concern.
David P. Primack*
When a small, private school in a football-crazed state has won more Tennessee football
-championships than anyone else, the slightest misstep by the school is likely to be noticed.
Unfortunately for Brentwood Academy, rival schools found evidence that Brentwood violated the
"recruiting rule" of Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), the governing entity of
high school athletics in the state. Brentwood cried foul and claimed that the TSSAA's recruiting rule
violated their First Amendment right to free speech. In the end, the Supreme Court will have to decide
whether or not the TSSAA is a "state actor" and therefore bound by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
In 1997, the coaches of Brentwood Academy sent letters to already accepted incoming ninth-
graders inviting them to participate in spring football practice, and left football tickets for a middle
school coach, which were later used by middle school students. The TSSAA considered both of these
actions to be violations of their "recruiting rule" and barred Brentwood from tournaments for two
years, placed the school on probation for four years, and fined it $3000. Founded in 1925, the TSSAA
is a voluntary association composed of 290 public and 55 private schools. It receives no funding from
the state but the Tennessee Code allows public schools to join the TSSAA if they choose to do so. The
TSSAA schedules only state athletic tournaments, not the vast majority of inter-school contests. The
recruiting rule in the TSSAA by-laws states, "The use of undue influence on a student.. .by any person
connected.. .with the school to secure or retain a student for athletic purposes shall be a violation of
the recruiting rule." The regulations then contain approximately three pages of explanation of what
constitutes "undue influence." It is uncontested that Brentwood's activities in 1997 would be "undue
influence" under TSSAA regulations. Approximately 40 other states have similar recruiting rules
imposed by similar statewide athletic organizations.
In their unanimous decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
overturned the district court's decision that the TSSAA was indeed a state actor. After showing that
the TSSAA was not an official arm of the state government, the question before the Sixth Circuit was
whether the TSSAA was so intertwined with the government that its actions should be treated as those
of the state. The Sixth Circuit relied on the "Blum trilogy", three United States Supreme Court cases, in
finding that the TSSAA was not a state actor.
In Blum v. Yaretsky (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that even though a private
entity is subject to state regulation, such as a nursing home, that regulation does not convert the actions
of the private entity into state action. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. (1982), the Court held that if a
private creditor works with the state to preattach property in a civil action for the securing of a debt,
the debtor may challenge the actions of the creditor under a violation of due process if the creditor's
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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actions are found to be "fairly attributable" to the state. Finally, in the third case of the Blum trilogy,
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn (1982), the Court held that a school owned by a private corporation did not
exercise state power when it fired teachers (allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights), even
though the school received most of its funding from the state. The Blurm trilogy provides the
framework for determining when an organization acts on behalf of the state, but since every dispute
requires a case-by-case analysis, the Sixth Circuit developed three tests to carry out the mandate of the
Blum trilogy: the public function test, the state compulsion test, and the symbiotic relationship test.
Applying each of these tests, the Sixth Circuit found that the TSSAA is not a state actor.
Management of interscholastic sports is not a power "traditionally exclusively reserved to the state,"
and hence not a "public function." The Tennessee legislature has never mentioned TSSAA, much less
given it any special authority, so there is no "state compulsion". As for a symbiotic relationship, the
court found that there was no "sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of
the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."
Finally, in overturning the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the district court
relied on dicta in the Supreme Court's decision of NCAA v. Tarkanian (1988) stating that a high school
athletic association might potentially be a state actor. Judge Ronald Gilman, writing for the Sixth
Circuit, noted that all nine justices agreed "even if an athletic association is a state actor when dealing
with a public school, it 'was not acting under color of state law in its relationships with private
universities."'
Brentwood Academy unsuccessfully petitioned for an en banc rehearing before the entire Sixth
Circuit. In dissenting from the Sixth Circuit's refusal to hear the case en banc, Judge Gilbert Merritt
cited from case law in other circuits holding that athletic associations are considered state actors.
Furthermore, the Tennessee Department of Education "delegates all of its plenary authority to control
high school athletics to TSSAA." Should TSSAA not be considered a state actor, and therefore not
bound by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Judge Merritt argued, the TSSAA could rule athletes
ineligible for competition on basis of race, gender, national origin, or religion. Pursuing Judge Merritt's
reasoning, the Southeast Law Institute, the Tennessee Lawyer's Association for Women, and the U.S.
Solicitor General have all filed amici briefs on Brentwood's behalf.
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99-901 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n
Ruling below: (66 Cir., 180 F.3d 758):
Voluntary statewide secondary school athletic association, incorporated under state law, that receives
no state funding, derives its revenues primarily from gate receipts at interscholastic athletic tournaments
that it sponsors, and pays rent for any public facilities that it uses for tournaments is not a state actor,
and thus its sanctions against private school member that allegedly violated association rule on
recruiting student athletes does not violate First Amendment.
Question presented: Does regulatory conduct of nominally private secondary school athletic
association, which "establishes and enforces all of the rules by which high school teams and players, at
both public and private schools, compete throughout the state of Tennessee," BrentwoodAcademy v.
Tennessee Secondary SchoolAthleticAss'n, 190 F.3d 705 (6 Cir. 1999) (Merritt, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc), and whose "membership consist[s] entirely of institutions located
within same State, many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign," NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n.13 (1988), constitute state action under 14' Amendment and under 42
U.S.C. 5 1983?
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BRENTWOOD ACADEMY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION; RONNIE CARTER, Executive Director and
Individually, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 98-6113
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
June 21, 1999, Decided
GILMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association's "recruiting rule." The rule
prohibits member schools from "the use of
undue influence ... to secure or retain a student
for athletic purposes. ..." Brentwood Academy,
a private school and a member of the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association ("TSSAA"), was found to have
violated the rule on two separate occasions.
After exhausting its internal appeals of TSSAA-
imposed sanctions, Brentwood brought the
present lawsuit to allege violations of its First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as a
host of other claims.
The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Brentwood on its claim
that the recruiting rule violates the First
Amendment, and enjoined TSSAA from
enforcing the rule. TSSAA brings this
interlocutory appeal, claiming that the district
court erred in determining that TSSAA is a
state actor, and further arguing that even if it is
a state actor, that the recruiting rule is not
violative of the First Amendment. For the
reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the
judgment of the district court, VACATE the
injunction, and REMAND the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Brentwood Academy, a private Christian
school located in Brentwood, Tennessee, is by
all accounts something of a high school football
powerhouse. The football team has been
nationally ranked by USA Today, has amassed a
310-43 record over the past 28 years (as of
March, 1998), and has won at least 7 TSSAA
state championships. Brentwood's basketball
team is also well known in athletic circles.
In 1997, various rival high school coaches
alleged that Brentwood had violated TSSAA
rules in a number of respects. TSSAA
conducted an investigation, which focused on
three specific incidents. The first incident
occurred when Brentwood's football coach
provided free tickets to a Brentwood football
game for a middle school coach and two
student athletes. The second claim also
involved the football coach, who sent a letter to
all incoming ninth-graders accepted at
Brentwood that invited them to join the
football team for spring practice while they
were still in the eighth grade. The final incident
involved the basketball coach conducting an
impermissible off-season practice for
Brentwood's current players. Because the off-
season practice by the basketball coach
allegedly violated the aptly-named "off-season
practice rule" rather than the "recruiting rule," it
is not at issue in this case. The two actions
involving the football coach, however, are
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based on alleged violations of the recruiting rule
and are thus the focus of this appeal.
As set forth in TSSAA's regulations, the
recruiting rule provides as follows:
The use of undue influence on a student
(with or without an athletic record), his or
her parents or guardians of a student by any
person connected, or not connected, with
the school to secure or retain a student for
athletic purposes shall be a violation of the
recruiting rule.
TSSAA By-laws, Article II, Section 21. The
regulations then contain approximately three
pages of interpretation to assist member
schools in understanding the types of
"influence" that TSSAA considers "undue."
With cooperation from Brentwood, TSSAA
completed its investigation in August of 1997.
TSSAA concluded that all three incidents
described above violated TSSAA rules.
Brentwood was declared ineligible to participate
in TSSAA tournaments in football and
basketball for one year, and was placed on
probation for two years. By the end of TSSAA's
two-step internal appeals process, the penalties
had actually increased, banning Brentwood
from the tournaments for two years, placing the
school on probation for four years, and fining
the school $3,000.
Brentwood filed the present suit against
TSSAA on December 12, 1997, seeking an
injunction against the enforcement of the
recruiting rule and alleging, among other state
and federal claims, a violation of 42 U.S.C J
1983. The § 1983 claim charged that TSSAA
had deprived Brentwood of its First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under color of
state law. Cross-motions for summary
judgment were filed with respect to all claims
except for Brentwood's allegations of antitrust
violations. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Brentwood on its First
Amendment claims and enjoined enforcement
of the recruiting rule. It granted summary
judgment in favor of TSSAA on one state-law
claim, and denied both motions on the
remaining counts. TSSAA now appeals the
district court's decision that TSSAA violated
the First Amendment, arguing that it is not a
"state actor," and that even if it is, its actions
were valid under the First Amendment.
II. ANALYSIS
B. State action and TSSAA
To prevail on a First Amendment claim, the
plaintiff must first make a showing that the
defendant is a "state actor." "When Congress
enacted § 1983 as the statutory remedy for
violations of the Constitution, it specified that
the conduct at issue must have occurred 'under
color of state law; thus liability attaches only to
those wrongdoers who carry a badge of
authority of a State and represent it in some
capacity...." *** The Supreme Court has
mandated careful adherence to the "state
action" requirement because it "preserves an
area of individual freedom by limiting the reach
of federal law."***
Analyzing the structure and function of
TSSAA is therefore essential to the inquiry
before us. Founded in 1925, TSSAA is a
voluntary association incorporated under the
laws of Tennessee. It is composed of 290
public schools and 55 private schools. TSSAA's
constitution and bylaws specify that the
administrative authority of TSSAA is vested in
a Board of Control consisting of nine members
elected by the member schools. Each Board
member represents a particular region of
Tennessee. The Board members are principals
or superintendents of the member schools. At
all times relevant to this action, the Board was
comprised exclusively of public high school
administrators, although private high school
administrators are equally eligible for election to
the board.
TSSAA receives no funding from the state,
nor are the salaries of its staff paid by the state.
Its revenues are derived primarily from gate
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receipts at TSSAA tournaments. TSSAA
schedules only the state tournaments, not the
vast majority of interscholastic contests.
Significantly, when it uses public facilities for
these events, it must enter into a contract with
the state to do so and pay for the privilege.
There is no authority anywhere in the
Tennessee Code authorizing the state to
conduct interscholastic athletics or to empower
another entity to conduct such athletics on its
behalf. Although a State Board of Education
rule in effect from 1972 to 1995 "designated"
TSSAA to conduct interscholastic athletics, that
rule has since been repealed. The current rule
states that public schools in Tennessee are
authorized to join TSSAA, but are also
authorized to withdraw from membership if
they so choose.
These facts make clear that TSSAA is not
an arm of the government. The more difficult
question is whether we are required to treat it as
such because it is so intertwined with the
government that its actions should be
considered as those of the state.
C. The Blum trilogy
The Supreme Court has devoted
considerable attention to the question of what
constitutes state action. In 1982, the Court
decided three cases that defined the contours of
the state action doctrine with respect to
nominally private parties. See Blum v. Yaretsky,
*** Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., *** and Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn ***. These cases have collectively
become known as the "Blum trilogy."
In Blum, the Court reviewed a challenge to a
private nursing home's transfer and discharge
policy. The nursing home was extensively
regulated by the state of New York and
received a significant percentage of its funding
from the federal government in the form of
Medicaid reimbursement. In holding that the
nursing home was not a state actor, the Court
concluded that being subject to state regulation
does not by itself convert the actions of a
private organization into state action. *** The
nursing home's use of government funds was
also held insufficient to establish state action.
In Lugar, Edmondson Oil had attached
Lugar's property to satisfy an outstanding debt.
Lugar sued, alleging that Edmondson Oil had
acted jointly with the state to deprive him of his
property without due process of law. The Court
held that Lugar had to establish that the
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a
constitutional right was "fairly attributable" to
the state. *** In determining the question of
fair attribution, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may be fairly
said to be a state actor, either because he acted
in his capacity as a state official, or because he
has acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials. *** The
Lugar Court concluded that because the
prejudgment attachment statute required
judicial action to be enforced, there was
sufficient government involvement to
constitute state action.
Finally, in Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court
held that a school operated by a private
corporation did not exercise state power when
it discharged teachers (allegedly in violation of
their First Amendment rights), even though the
school had contracts with the state to pay for
the education of most of the student body and
most of its funding came from the government.
D. Sixth Circuit Precedent
The Blum trilogy provides a framework for
determining what conduct may be fairly
attributable to the state. It does not set out a
single test, because the Court has held that
determinations of state action must be made on
a case-by-case basis. *** In attempting to
enforce the mandate of the Blum trilogy, our
circuit has applied three different tests. These
are (1) the public function test, (2) the state
compulsion test, and (3) the symbiotic
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relationship test. *** The focus of all three tests
is to determine whether the alleged state actor's
actions are "fairly attributable to the state." *
1. The public function test
The public function test asks whether "the
private entity exercises powers which are
traditionally exclusively reserved to the state,
such as holding elections, or eminent domain."
*** Clearly the conduct of interscholastic sports
is not such a power. The Supreme Court stated
in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc, v. United
States Olympic Committee, *** that "neither the
conduct not the coordination of amateur sports
has been a traditional government function."
We also note that all of the circuits that have
considered the issue, including our own, have
held that there is no constitutional right to
participate in interscholastic sports. *** In light
of these precedents, TSSAA cannot be
considered a state actor under the public
function test.
2. State compuhion
The state compulsion test requires that the
party seeking to establish state action prove that
the state has so coerced or encouraged a private
entity to act that the choice of that entity must
be regarded as the choice of the state. *** As
detailed in Part II.B. above, the state of
Tennessee's interaction with TSSAA has been
minimal. The state's most significant
involvement with TSSAA was the now-repealed
Board of Education rule "designating" TSSAA
to conduct interscholastic activities. The
Supreme Court has made clear, however, that
designation alone is not enough to turn a
private actor into a state actor. In Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison *** a customer whose power
was turned off for non-payment argued that he
was entitled to a hearing under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court held that even though Pennsylvania had
granted the power company a monopoly and
the public utility board had explicitly authorized
the regulations in question, there was no state
action because the state had not directed or
ordered that the customer's power be
terminated. ***
The state of Tennessee has far less contact
with TSSAA than Pennsylvania had with
Metropolitan Edison. The Pennsylvania
legislature granted Metropolitan Edison a
monopoly, heavily regulated it, and had a state
oversight board that actually approved the
power shut-off regulations. In the present case,
the Tennessee legislature has never even
mentioned TSSAA, much less given it any
special authority. As a result, Brentwood has
failed to establish that TSSAA is a state actor
under the state compulsion test.
3. Symbiotic relationsho
The remaining and therefore dispositive
question is whether TSSAA is a state actor
under the "symbiotic relationship" test. * A
symbiotic relationship exists when there is "a
sufficiently close nexus between the state and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated
as that of the state itself." *** In Crowder v.
Conlan, *** this court held that neither extensive
state regulation nor state funding of a private
entity are sufficient to support a finding of a
symbiotic relationship. Instead, a "State
normally can be held responsible for a private
decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State." ***
a. Burrows
Burmws v. Ohio High School Athletic
Association *** is instructive in this regard. In
Burrows this court considered a challenge to an
Ohio High School Athletic Association
(OHSAA) rule that deprived students of one
year of interscholastic eligibility if they
participated in soccer leagues outside of the
school system. After reviewing the structure
and functions of OHSAA, the Burrows court
concluded that it was not a state actor. Burrows
held that in order to prove that a high school
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athletic association is acting under color of state
law, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that
the association's action was "caused, controlled
or directed by the state or its agencies." ***
This Brentwood has failed to do in the present
case.
Because Burmows is the most recent
pronouncement by our court on the question
of whether a state high school athletic
association is a state actor, we would under
normal circumstances look no further in
finding persuasive support for our conclusion
that TSSAA is not a state actor. For reasons
unknown, however, Burrows does not cite either
of two earlier Sixth Circuit cases that discuss
the state-actor status of OHSAA and reach the
opposite conclusion. We are therefore obligated
to consider each of these prior cases.
b. Yellow Springs
The earlier of the two uncited cases is
Yellow Springs v. Ohio High School Athletic
Association *** Both the district court and
Brentwood rely heavily on Yellow Springs to
support their conclusion that TSSAA is a state
actor. They reason that OHSAA and TSSAA
are functionally indistinguishable, and that
Yellow Springs is controlling because it precedes
Burrows.
If they are correct, then Yellow Springs would
necessarily bind us. We agree with Brentwood
that when a later decision of this court conflicts
with the holding of a prior decision, the earlier
case should control. *** The holding of Yellow
Springs, however, is not in conflict with either
Burmws or our present decision.
In Yellow Springs, a school district brought a
Title IX challenge to an OHSAA rule that
prohibited co-ed teams in contact sports. *** In
reciting the facts of the case, this court wrote
that "OHSAA's character as a semi-official in
its activities and its symbiotic relationship with
the state lead to the conclusion that the trial
judge correctly found state action."
Brentwood argues that this statement is binding
in the case before us. We disagree. Yellow Springs
involved Title IX, a statute enacted to
discourage sex discrimination in education
regardless of whether the action was
governmental or not. Unlike claims brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment, private
entities may be liable under Title IX without a
showing of state action, as long as they are a
recipient of federal funds. *** Because the
Yellow Springs discussion of state action in the
context of Title IX was superfluous, and the
body of the Yellow Springs analysis concentrated
on Title IX, the statements about state action
are dicta and do not have the force of law.
c. Alerding
This brings us to Alerding v. Ohio High School
Athletic Association, *** the other relevant case
not cited by Burmws. Brentwood argues that
even if Yellow Springs is not controlling
authority, we are still bound by Alerding.
Alerding involved a challenge to an OHSAA rule
that prohibited students who lived in other
states from participating in interscholastic
athletics in Ohio. Student-athletes affected by
the rule sued OHSAA pursuant to 42 U.S.C f
1983, alleging an infringement of their rights
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The entire body
of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of the
students' claims, which the court ultimately
rejected.
Alerdin's mention of the state action issue
is relegated to a single footnote. It provides no
analysis on this point whatsoever, and cites only
one case, Yellow Springs, which dealt with the
state action question in dicta. More importantly,
the relevant footnote reads as follows:
OHSAA is a state actor for purposes of 5
1983 because Ohio has implicitly delegated
to OHSAA its power to regulate and
organize interscholastic activities. [citing
Yellow Springs].
Thus, Alerding's finding of state action was
premised exclusively on Ohio's "implicit
delegation." In contrast, Tennessee explicitly
revoked its designation of TSSAA to regulate and
organize interscholastic athletics when the State
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Board of Education's rule to that effect was
repealed in 1995. Because we find this
distinction fundamental, we conclude that
Alerding does not dictate the outcome of the
present case.
E. Tarkanian's footnote 13
Finally, we note that in finding state action,
the district court relied on the fact that the
Supreme Court indicated in dicta that a high
school athletic association might potentially be
a state actor. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, *** ("The
situation would ... be different if the
membership consisted entirely of institutions
located within the same state, many of them
public institutions created by the same
sovereign.") In the very same footnote,
however, the majority opinion notes that all
nine justices agreed that even if an athletic
association is a state actor when dealing with a
public school, it "was not acting under color of
state law in its relationships with private
universities." As a result, we do not find that
the Supreme Court's comments are controlling
in the present case.
F. TSSAA not a state actor
Based on the above analysis, we conclude
that (1) Brentwood has failed to establish that
TSSAA's actions are fairly attributable to the
state of Tennessee, and (2) we are not obligated
to hold otherwise because of any prior binding
precedent. As a result, no § 1983 claim may be
brought against TSSAA by a member school
that has voluntarily associated with the private
organization. We therefore have no need to
reach the merits of Brentwood's claims under
the First Amendment. In so stating, we do not
necessarily endorse the wisdom of the rule that
TSSAA is attempting to enforce in this case.
Brentwood has made strong arguments that the
rule is vague and not well-tailored to the
perceived evil sought to be avoided, which in
turn may lead to arbitrary enforcement. Such
complaints, however, are to be resolved among
the membership of the TSSAA, not in the
federal courts. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's
statement that:
we are not super referees over high school
athletic programs. Questions about eligibility
for competition may loom large in the eyes of
youths, even parents. We do not disparage their
interest in concluding, as here, that these issues
are not of constitutional magnitude. ***
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we
REVERSE the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Brentwood,
VACATE the injunction, and REMAND the
case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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SCHOOL CASE ENDS UP IN SUPREME COURT
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, March 7,2000
Eric Sondheimer
Everyone knew the day was coming when
high school sports became as important as life
or death.
Well, the apocalypse is upon us.
The U.S. Supreme Court, which turns down
hundreds of appeals from Death Row inmates,
has agreed to use its precious time to decide
whether a state high school athletic association
can prohibit private schools from recruiting
athletes.
In the case of Brentwood Academy vs.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. to
be heard next fall, the Supreme Court is
entering volatile territory.
Emotions are not running as high as Roe
vs. Wade, the 1973 decision that established
abortion rights. The stakes are not as far-
reaching as Brown vs. Topeka, Kan., Board of
Education, the 1954 decision that abolished
segregation in public schools.
But don't tell that to the sports-crazed
families who reside in Tennessee, Texas,
California or any community where high school
sports has become a rite of absolute passion.
Brentwood Academy's attorney fees have
surpassed $ 1 million since the school filed a
lawsuit in 1997 after the TSSAA barred the
school's football and basketball teams from the
state playoffs for two years and imposed a $
3,000 fine for having improper contact with
middle school athletes.
Brentwood went to federal court, claiming
the TSSAA's recruiting rules that barred
coaches from talking to athletes violated First
Amendment rights to free speech. A district
court judge ruled in favor of Brentwood. The
Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cincinnati reversed the district court ruling.
But the Supreme Court granted
Brentwood's request last month to review the
lawsuit, opening the way for a significant ruling
that could affect state high school athletic
associations throughout the nation.
The TSSAA's recruiting rules are similar to
those of the California Interscholastic
Federation and athletic associations in other
states. Make them illegal and who knows what
kind of open combat would break out between
public and private schools seeking the boy who
can run the fastest 40-yard dash or the girl who
can hit a softball the farthest.
"It would destroy the concept of fairness,"
said Robert Kanaby, executive director of the
National Federation of State High School Assn.
"It would be like the voucher system in reverse.
The rich would get richer and the poor would
get poorer."
Ronnie Carter, executive director of the
TSSAA, said "chaos" would reign if schools
were allowed to contact any students they want.
"We'd have high schools in our state
literally contacting kids in seventh and eighth
grade like the colleges do," Carter said. "Just
picture the Los Angeles area if everybody could
talk to every kid and try to get them to go to
every high school. We will create an even more
extreme picture of sports being the panacea
that solves everyone's life."
Dean Crowley, who recently retired as
commissioner of the Southern Section, said
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throwing out recruiting rules would be "a death sports recruiting has reached the Supreme
blow" to high school athletics. Court.
"When you're getting into recruiting, you're "We've almost created a monster," Carter
talking lots of money," Crowley said. "You said.
don't know what incentives are paid under the
table. It's almost incomprehensible we've gotten
this far. It's a scary possibility." Copyright © 2000 Times Mirror Company
Brentwood was penalized because of two
recruiting violations. The football coach sent a
letter to incoming ninth-graders inviting them
to participate in spring football practice. The
letter was sent only to new students who had
been accepted for admission and was followed
up with a phone call. The other violation
involved football tickets being left for a middle
school coach that were used by middle school
students. Both actions would also be violations
for a school governed by the CIF.
Brentwood, a nine-time Tennessee state
champion in football, contends it is a violation
of free speech to prevent private schools from
communicating with potential students.
"This has to do with fairness and
accountability and the right of Brentwood to
tell their story and the right of parents and
students to hear their story," said Tom Nebel,
an attorney for Brentwood.
The question of free speech rights might
not be decided by the Supreme Court. The legal
question before the court is whether state high
school athletic associations are public or
private. The district court ruled the TSSAA was
a state actor, bounding it to follow the
Constitution. The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling
the TSSAA was not a state actor.
"I hope the Supreme Court will definitely
declare these state high school associations are
truly voluntary and not state actors, and maybe
we won't see the proliferation of lawsuits," said
Rick Colbert, an attorney for the TSSAA.
Blame whomever--coaches, parents, high
schools, colleges, attorneys, the media--but it's
amazing that a lawsuit involving high school
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COURT TO SETTLE TSSAA, BRENTWOOD ACADEMY DISPUTE
Chattanooga Times / Chattanooga Free Press
Wednesday, February 23, 2000
Laude Asseo, The Associated Press
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court
said Tuesday it will decide the dispute between
the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association and Brentwood Academy.
Justices said they will rule whether some
high school athletic associations can be sued for
allegedly violating their members' rights.
The court agreed to hear arguments by
Brentwood Academy, whose lawyers say it can
sue the TSSAA because the association acted
on behalf of the state government.
Brentwood Academy, a private school just
south of Nashville, has won nine state football
titles.
In 1997, rival football coaches alleged that
Brentwood violated TSSAA rules. The school
was accused of providing football tickets to two
middle school athletes and of inviting some
boys to join the football team for spring
practice while they were still in the eighth grade.
The athletic association bars members from
using "undue influence ... to secure or retain a
student for athletic purposes." The association
decided that the incidents violated its rules and
put Brentwood on probation for four years,
banned it from tournaments for two years and
fined it $3,000.
The school sued the association under a
federal civil rights law, and a federal judge in
Nashville issued an order barring enforcement
of the recruiting rule.
The 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, saying the athletic association could
not be sued under the civil rights law because
its decision was not government action. The
civil rights law provides remedies only for
government violations of people's rights.
In the appeal acted on Tuesday,
Brentwood's lawyers said the athletic
association was controlled by public school
principals.
"We've been confident all along that were
correct," said Tom Nebel, a Nashville lawyer
representing Brentwood Academy. "We're
excited about it, but it's a cautious optimism
that we have right now."
The TSSAA declined comment on the
decision Tuesday, saying its lawyers needed
time to review the latest development. The
TSSAA has about 375 member schools.
The athletic association's lawyers said
during the litigation that it was a private
organization whose rules are intended to keep
schools from "treating school-aged children as
athletes first and students second."
Last April, the academy's Carlton Flatt
resigned after 29 years as head football coach,
citing his conflict with the TSSAA. He had
coached the team to all nine state
championships.
The case is important beyond Tennessee
because about 40 other states have a similar
recruiting rule for high school athletes.
Copyright 0 2000 Chattanooga Publishing
Company
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LEVELING THE AMICUS FIELD
Medill News Service
Kai Neumeyer
When Lee Barfield, the general counsel
for Brentwood Academy, made a pitch to
the Tennessee Association of
Independent Schools at a retreat in the fall
of 1999, the headmaster of Memphis
University School was sympathetic.
Barfield had come to the meeting to enlist
the association's help in a case he was
working on, one he hoped to take to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Ellis Haguewood didn't think he was the
only headmaster at the retreat who felt
that the statewide organization governing
high-school athletics should have to abide
by the U.S. Constitution. Nor did he think
he was alone in his support for
Brentwood Academy's 1998 lawsuit
against the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association for abridging
Brentwood coaches' 1st Amendment
rights by imposing strict recruiting
regulations.
As it turned out, Haguewood's school
would be the first to answer Barfield's call.
When Barfield attended the oral
arguments before the 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals in July 1999 after Brentwood had
won the case at trial, lawyers for six
different state athletic associations and the
National Federation of State High School
Associations were also there on behalf of
the TSSAA as amicus curiae.
Literally "friends of the court," amicus
curiae are intended to be impartial experts
who write briefs to aid a court's decision.
However, amici take sides when they offer
their expertise.
The TSSAA had seven friends that day;
Brentwood had none.
"Brentwood's attorneys said the court
was, I won't say influenced, but they were
impressed," Haguewood said.
Appeals Judge Ralph Guy was so
impressed with the number of amici
backing the association that he asked
Brentwood's lawyers who was supporting
them, recalled Barfield.
"It's just us and the constitution," the
lawyers told the judge.
But one school and the constitution might
not be enough to get the Brentwood case
through the Supreme Court door, Barfield
thought, so he asked the Tennessee
Association of Independent Schools to
become an anicus.
Unfortunately, there was no precedent for
the schools association taking a side as an
amicus in a legal case, and the
headmasters decided it would be best for
individual schools to file briefs on their
own, Haguewood said.
But who would go first?
"I had hoped that someone else would
take the lead," Haguewood said.
Haguewood soon learned that eastern and
middle Tennessee schools weren't
planning to file amicus briefs. Those
schools are ones that actually compete
with Brentwood athletically.
"They have more to lose," Haguewood
said, explaining why they are less likely to
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side against TSSAA in its allegations that
Brentwood violated recruiting regulations.
Brentwood was sanctioned in 1997 by the
TSSAA for giving prospective students
and their coach tickets to a football game
and inviting middle school athletes to join
the high school team's spring practice.
"Schools closest to Brentwood Academy
have resented their athletic successes and
think they've gone too far in recruiting,"
Haguewood said.
But Haguewood knew that if the Supreme
Court ruled that the TSSAA is not a state
entity and is therefore free to impose its
own rules and regulations that the
decision would impair the ability of any
independent school to recruit students--
not just athletes.
"The issue is much bigger than
[Brentwood's recruiting violations],"
Haguewood said. "I think all independent
schools recognize that."
And because he is one of the few
headmasters who keeps up with athletic
matters, Haguewood decided he was the
logical one to take action.
He took the matter up at a regular lunch
meeting of local headmasters in the
Memphis Association of Independent
Schools, telling his colleagues that
Memphis University School had already
decided to pay all the legal fees for writing
the amicus brief. Haguewood asked them
to simply add their names to the brief.
"I tried to make it as attractive as
possible," Haguewood said.
All the Memphis schools that have athletic
teams agreed to join, except for one
unusual case in which a school had just
been readmitted to the TSSAA, and didn't
want to ruffle any feathers, according to
Haguewood.
The idea is that having the names of 10
schools on the amicus brief will show the
Supreme Court the magnitude of the case.
"It's not one school sitting out there in the
middle of nowhere," said George B.
Elder, the headmaster of amicus Lausanne
Collegiate School. "The TSSAA wields
tremendous power. It's important that the
Supreme Court knows there are other
schools who believe in Brentwood's
position.
And though the only schools to file an
amicus brief are from Tennessee, more
than 40 states have an organization similar
to the TSSAA governing high school
athletics, and are likely to be affected by
the Supreme Court decision.
The national scope of the case has lured
more "friends" of Brentwood to file amici
briefs, however.
In May 2000, the National Women's Law
Center, the National Voting Rights
Institute, the Southeast Law Institute as
well as the Tennessee Lawyers'Association
for Women all filed briefs on Brentwood's
behalf. ***
Copyright C 2000 Medill News Services
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Also This Term:
99-1235 Green Tree Financial Corp.------Alabama v. Randolph
Ruling below (11"' Cir., 178 F.3d 1149, 68 U.S.L.W. 1021):
District court order compelling arbitration of all claims raised in complaint and dismissing complaint
with prejudice is "final decision" appealable under Federal Arbitration Act; arbitration provision in
consumer credit contract that is silent on subject of arbitration fees and costs is unenforceable due to
risk that imposition of large fees and costs on consumer may defeat remedial purposes of Truth in
Lending Act.
Questions presented: (1) Did court of appeals err in concluding that order compelling arbitration and
dismissing lawsuit's underlying claims is "final decision with respect an arbitration" appealable under 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)? (2) Did court of appeals err in concluding that arbitration provision that was "silent"
on issue of costs and fees was unenforceable under Federal Arbitration Act because risk that plaintiff
"might" be required to bear unknown costs and fees potentially undermined her ability to vindicate
statutory rights?
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